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Abstract

Prior research has suggested that models intended to explain the organizational
commitment of public employees have not accounted for the substantial and often intense
external controls imposed on public organizations. A public scandal involving corruption
and mismanagement in a New York State public school district resulted in the state
legislature implementing a program of reforms intended to increase the financial
accountability of public school districts. The aim of this exploratory, multi-subject
qualitative study is to gain insight about how financial managers in public school districts
experienced the reform and think about external controls that feature an extensive
regimen of auditing. According to the ten school business officials that participated in the
study, the accountability demands produced by the reform have affected their work
environment in tangible ways. Data from structured interviews with the study participants
revealed a) how they entered and became established in the school business career field,
b) how participants assess the utility of the reform elements, and c) the participants’
strategies for survival in the post-reform environment. The participants: generally
prepared for a career in business and entered the occupation through the civil service;
have varying opinions about the utility and appropriateness of the reform elements; and
consistently agree that over the ten years since the reform legislation was passed, the
audit regime has produced little benefit relative to its cost, yet has been a major factor in
creating an environment that is substantially more difficult for school business officials to
survive in. Of particular interest for this project was elaborating on the mechanisms by

which external controls affect the psychological attachments that bind public sector
financial managers to their organizations. The study findings generally support the view
that a public financial manager’s organizational commitment is a function of their
perceptual constructions of the job autonomy and supervisor support that they enjoy.
Reputation, which is moderated by exposure in the news media, also appears to be an
important factor.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
In the wake of the 2004 scandal involving corruption and mismanagement in the Roslyn
(NY) Union Free School District, the New York State Legislature passed legislation requiring
that public school districts be subjected to several oversight measures beyond the traditional
annual financial audit performed by an independent, external auditor (Office of the Comptroller,
2004). This intensification of audit surveillance is consistent with Roberts’ (2009) observation
that after a significant failure of oversight, principals make “repeated investment in ever more
extensive measures in an attempt to fabricate the certainties of knowing in advance and at a
distance, and thereby escape the anxiety of real dependence” (p. 969). Nonetheless, it has been
shown that even promising reform strategies can produce perverse consequences when
implemented (Hood & Peters, 2004; Roberts, 2002). Therefore it is possible that an imposed
audit regime, especially if perceived as unnecessarily coercive and potentially punitive by those
being audited, might create conditions that lead to less accountability, not more (Pautz &
Washington, 2009; Power, 2003; Shapiro & Matson, 2007).
Problem
More than three decades of research supports the widely-held belief that positive
organizational outcomes and performance depend on committed employees working toward
organizational goals. It has been shown that committed employees will be less likely to exhibit
negative workplace behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover, and more likely to exhibit
positive ones (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky, 2002; Williams & Anderson, 1991;
Eisenberger, Fasolo & Davis-LaMastro, 1990). However, recent research has suggested that
models intended to explain the organizational commitment (OC) of public employees must
account for the effects of substantial and often intense external controls imposed on public
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organizations (Stazyk, Pandey & Wright, 2011). External controls meant to ensure good
behavior of public employees have the potential to undermine the psychological commitment of
public employees, weakening their resolve toward achieving organizational and social goals.
Purpose
The aim of this exploratory, multi-subject, qualitative study is to gain insight about how
auditees in public organizations experience and think about external controls that feature an
extensive regimen of auditing. Of particular interest is how the intensification of an audit-based
system of external controls might affect the psychological attachments that bind the auditees to
their organizations. For this project, the auditees are school district officials responsible for the
day-to-day financial functions of a public school district (school business officials). The system
of external controls is operationalized as a state-imposed program of financial accountability
reforms.
Research Question
The central research question explored is: “how do business officials in public school
districts, as auditees, perceive the effects of a recent financial accountability/audit reform program;
and in what ways do their perceptions affect the psychological attachments that bind them to their
organizations?” The following sub-questions serve to guide the exploration of different aspects of the
central research question.
1. How do these school business officials describe and explain the effects of the reform on
their work environment, activities and relations?
2. How do these school business officials describe and explain the effects of the reform on
their professional identities, motivations and commitments?
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In pursuing these questions, aspects about the nature of the school business official’s work as
well as their work environments and careers are revealed.
Significance of the Study
The study is instructive from a three perspectives. First, the study contributes to public
sector organizational commitment theory by offering a more detailed theoretical model that
might better explain how reform activities work to influence psychological and institutional
dynamics of the structure-agency relationship in school districts.
Secondly, in light of continued calls to install SOX1-like regulation throughout the public
sector (Brown, 2005; Frank, 2008), policy-makers charged with ensuring that public financial
resources have sufficient oversight should be interested in learning how financial administrators
in public organizations are affected by new accountability demands. Higher education programs,
many of which are part of state university systems, must create training programs to produce
competent, resilient people capable of creatively and effectively managing scarce financial
resources in a politically-charged, yet increasingly regulated context.
Thirdly, from the perspective of practice, this project may help practicing and prospective
school business officials avoid the atrophy of personal responsibility that is an unintended
consequence of the “paradox of accountability2” by encouraging regular reflection about their

1 SOX is a commonly-used name for the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, a federal law that set stricter standards
for U.S. public company boards, management and public accounting firms. SOX was enacted as a reaction to
major financial scandals of the time, including Enron.
2 “Responsible interpretation and application of external accountability demands ultimately depends on the
cultivation of the virtues that support good administrative judgment, but the institutions and mechanisms that
are used to communicate these external standards, and that monitor compliance with them, often threaten the
very qualities that support responsible judgment.” (Jos & Tompkins, 2004, p. 255).
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own agency and contribution toward social goals. For it is the reflection about ethical
stewardship of public funds, rather than excessive reliance on external standards, that is essential
for a successful career in the public sector (Harmon, 1995; Jos & Tompkins, 2004; Roberts,
2002; Schön, 1983).
Conceptual Framework
Public administration, industrial psychology/human resource management, and accounting
were the three primary fields drawn upon to form the basis for the initial conceptual framework.
The framework posits that reforms work by requiring structural changes to which then
individuals adapt their behavior and form/modify their beliefs in response to the structural
changes. Extant theories suggest that:
1. Public organizations at the local level are subject to the external control of the state
(Benson, 1965; Seder, 2000; United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1993), and when accountability failures occur external controls are intensified
by the state and manifest as reforms (Roberts, 2009);
2. Subordinate organizations initially respond to financial reforms with resistance
(Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991; Shapiro & Matson, 2007), but ultimately adjust internal
structures to align with reform goals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Verbruggen,
Christiaens & Milis, 2011).
3. Changes to internal structures tend to constrain managerial discretion, (Bozeman, 2000;
Moe, 1989) and so will threaten the level of job autonomy enjoyed by agency managers
(O’Toole & Meyer, 1999);
4. Audit processes reveal failures to meet accountability standards (Ashbaugh-Skaife,
Collins & Kinney, 2007; Beaver, 1989), and negative audit findings may cause an agency
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manager to anticipate a reduced level of supervisory support (Desai, Hogan & Wilkins,
2006);
5. Loss of job autonomy and loss of perceived supervisor support may affect a leader’s
organizational commitment (Brimeyer, Perrucci & Wadsworth, 2010), and so lead to
negative workplace behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover (Mathieu & Zajac,
1990).
The model that follows graphically depicts an incomplete causal theory of group behavior based
on the preceding propositions. Decisions to emphasize the perceptions of the auditees and deemphasize the structural changes on the district caused by the reform, and more importantly, the
findings of this study require that this model be modified.
Figure 1: Initial Theoretical Construct
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Summary of the Methodology
The analytical methodology for the analysis is the constant comparative method
pioneered by Glaser and Strauss (1967) using an approach described by Boeije (2002) as
“purposeful” (p. 392). Boeije’s approach was selected because it is applicable to grounded theory
as well as other traditions and types of qualitative research (p. 391). The first several participants
were recruited for the study using snowball sampling. Later in the process, participants were
recruited using theoretical sampling. The primary data collection technique employed for the
project was structured interviewing. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and reviewed by the
participants. The coding process began by selecting provisional codes drawn from the initial
theoretical model that was developed from the extant literature. The provisional coding was
followed by an open coding cycle for the purpose of capturing codes from the corpus that were
not anticipated in the preliminary model. The initial coding was followed by a cycle of axial
coding focused on values, attitudes and beliefs of the participants. Selective coding then resulted
in an iterative process of summaries being written, re-coded and re-written. Findings were then
compiled, reviewed and checked.
Limitations
In all research, internal validity refers to the assurance that the inferences made based on
the data collected are accurate. Because in qualitative research the researcher is the instrument, a
primary source of internal validity threats in qualitative studies is the researcher. This is either by
virtue of characteristics that could cause the interview subjects to give incomplete or inaccurate
responses, or by biases that might cause the researcher to interpret responses incorrectly. While
the personal characteristics of the researcher undertaking this research study, particularly age and
experience as a school business official, benefitted the study by establishing the tone for the
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interview as a conversation between colleagues, the risk is still present. Even when the research
instrument functions well, there is also the potential for plausible alternative explanations.
As is often the case in qualitative research, the sampling was theoretical rather than
random or probability-based sampling. Generalization of findings to broader populations would
be speculative.
Institutional Context
The reform of interest for this project is the implementation of amendments to Chapters
2633 and 2674 of the Laws of New York, 2005 signed into law on July 19, 2005. Excerpts of the
legislative history are provided in Appendix A. The reform package is a direct result of a scandal
associated with the criminal indictment of top school district officials for alleged embezzlement
of millions of dollars in the Roslyn Union Free School District on Long Island, New York.
The design of the legislation is based on the “Hevasi Five-Point Plan” proposed in June
of 2004 by then-State Comptroller Alan Hevasi. The legislation required that the State
Comptroller complete an audit on every school district in the state within five years (by mid2010). Regular audits of school districts by the State Comptroller had been discontinued in the
early 1980’s as a cost reduction measure. In addition to re-establishing auditing of public school
districts as a responsibility of the State Comptroller, and leaving the requirement for an annual
external financial audit in place, the legislation mandates seven reform measures. These require:

3 Text of the amendment is found at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/schoolsfa/chapter263.pdf.
4 Text of the amendment is found at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/schoolsfa/chapter267.pdf.
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1. School districts to limit the term length of auditor contracts and also to utilize competitive
bidding or request for proposal (RFP) processes for the procurement of external auditing
services. Using a competitive process is also known as audit tendering;
2. School districts to create an internal audit function. This function conducts an annual
review and update of policies, procedures and internal controls;
3. School districts to utilize an audit committee that reports to the school board;
4. Auditing of school districts by the Office of the New York State Comptroller
(Performance audits);
5. Strengthening the claims auditor function by clarifying that the claims auditor reports
directly to the board, and allowing the board to use contractors to fulfill the claims audit
function;
6. Voting school board members to attend six hours of financial training within one year of
appointment or election, with the training curriculum prepared by the Commissioner of
Education in consultation with the Comptroller.5
7. School districts to formally respond to audit findings by creating a Corrective Action
Plan (CAP) within 90 days and implementing the CAP by the end of the next fiscal year.
Definition of Terms
“School business official” or SBO refers to an educational administrator charged with
managing the day to day financial and business-related operations of a public school district. In
New York a person may hold a school business position by completing educational and practical

5 Chapter 388 of the Laws of New York, 2010 adds a requirement for board members elected or appointed for
a first term beginning on or after July 1, 2011 to complete a course in school district governance. For purposes
of this project, this addition is not considered part of the reform package.
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requirements to be granted an appropriate educational certificate or by passing an appropriate
civil service test. This position reports to the school district’s superintendent.
“Certified Public Accountant” or CPA refers to an accountant who by virtue of their
education and experience as well as passing an intensive qualifying exam is licensed by their
state to practice accountancy in that state.
“Chief Financial Officer” or CFO refers to the senior manager responsible for overseeing
the financial activities of an entire company. The term has become popular in the non-profit and
public sectors as well.
“School district” is a political sub-division authorized by the state to operate a school system
comprised of one or more schools. In New York, school districts are classified as “Common,”
“Union Free” or “Central” school districts. Common school districts are authorized to operate
elementary (kindergarten through grade 8) schools. Union Free school districts are formed by
combining two or more common school districts to operate a high school program. Central school
districts have the legal authority to independently raise taxes to operate both elementary and high
schools to serve suburban or rural areas. Central school districts are formed by merging smaller
school districts of any classification.

“Organizational commitment” is a psychological construct that represents the strength of
an individual’s identification with and his or her involvement in a particular organization
(Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979). Organizational commitment implies that a person: 1) believes
in the organization’s goals and core values (identification), 2) is willing to exert effort beyond
the minimum required on behalf of the organization (involvement), and 3) has a strong intent or
desire to remain with the organization (loyalty).
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“Job autonomy” is a psychological construct that represents the latitude an individual
manager perceives that they have to control their work situation. Facets of autonomy include
scheduling work, determining priorities, and evaluating success.
“Perceived supervisor support” (PSS) is a psychological construct that refers to a
person’s perceptions of the support extended by their supervisor. In the case of a school business
official, the supervisor would be the school district’s superintendent. Because supervisors act as
agents of an organization, PSS is closely related to perceived organizational support (POS), a
person’s perceptions of the support extended by the organization. In the case of a school business
official, the organization would be the school district.
“External audit” refers to any review of the financial statements or reports of a
government or business entity by someone not affiliated with that agency or company. In New
York, a public school district is required by law to undergo an external audit of financial
statements on an annual basis. School districts are also subject to review by federal and state
auditors on demand.
“Mandatory auditor rotation” (or “external auditor rotation” or “auditor” rotation) refers
to a legal or regulatory requirement for an organizational entity to select a different external
auditor than the current one after a specified period of time.
“Audit tendering” is the process of utilizing a competitive process, whether required or
not, for the procurement of external auditing services. Audit tendering may lead to auditor
rotation, but audit tendering does not require auditor rotation.
“Internal controls” refers to the set of organizational processes and procedures, checks
and balances that are designed to provide management with reasonable assurance that the goals
and objectives it believes important to the entity will be met. These goals and objectives typically
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are to produce reliable financial information, promote efficient operations, comply with
applicable laws, regulations and policies, and detect fraud (Graham, 2008). In the United States,
a high level of internal control is mandated by federal law. The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) bill,
enacted on July 30, 2002, established new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company
boards, their managements and public accounting firms. While public entities have long
employed internal controls, events like the scandal in the Roslyn school district bring the
adequacy of the controls into question.
“Internal audit” is an appraisal activity established by the organization’s management to
review financial operations as a means of assuring conformance with management policies and
the effectiveness of internal controls. Internal auditing should conform to generally accepted
standards for internal auditing. In New York public school districts, the internal audit function
reviews financial policies, procedures and practices, tests and evaluates internal controls; and
recommend changes for strengthening controls and reducing identified risks at least annually.
“Claims audit” is an a priori review of a demand for payment to determine whether: the
claim is for a valid and legal purpose; was authorized and approved by an appropriate official;
there are sufficient appropriations to pay the claim; and, the claim is sufficiently detailed and free
of mathematical errors (Office of the New York State Comptroller, 2013).
“Performance audit,” as used by the Office of the New York State Comptroller (2004), is
an “objective and systematic examination of evidence for the purpose of providing an
independent assessment of the performance of an organization to improve public accountability
and decision-making.” 6

6 http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/index.htm
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“Corrective action plan” refers to the required response to an audit report. It is not merely
an acknowledgement. In New York, the school district administration is required by law to
explain in sufficient detail what actions the district will take to correct each finding or
recommendation for improvement identified by the auditor in the audit report. Corrective action
plans are filed with the Office of the State Comptroller and with the State Education Department.
“Request for proposal,” also known as an RFP, is a competitive process commonly used
by public agencies to procure goods or services that are not easily specified or where price is not
the primary criterion for selecting a vendor. RFPs are typically used to procure professional
services, such as legal, architectural, or auditing services.
Organization of the Report
In Chapter 1, the reader is introduced to the reason for doing the study, the research
problem, and specific research questions. A description of the theoretical context, summary of
method, and disclaimers are provided along with sufficient background to continue reading the
study in an accessible way. In Chapter 2, a literature review is presented that provides the
theoretical basis for conducting this particular study. The thematic review draws on accounting,
industrial psychology/human resource management, and public management research. In
Chapter 3, the methodology is described in detail. In Chapter 4, findings are organized in three
themes and presented. Chapter Five concludes the study. In Chapter 5, the findings are related to
existing research and interpretations are discussed. Recommendations for future research and
researcher reflections are presented, then the report is concluded.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
Finding effective institutional arrangements for assuring a central government that distant
local governments are behaving in ways that serve the interests of both the central government
and the public presents a classic principal-agent problem. Reflecting the goal conflict between
principals and agents that is assumed in agency theory, organizational behavior theorists have
argued that managers use discretion to their own advantage (Hood, 2007; Oliver, 1991).
Monitoring has long been seen as necessary for relieving the information asymmetry that is the
root of hidden action and hidden information problems characteristic of agency relationships
(Arrow, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). In financial management, audits function to facilitate
information transfer between principal and agent by exposing previously hidden financial data,
thereby lessening the information deficit of the principal. Thus for principals, auditing is a useful
and highly valued monitoring system (Wallace, 2004).
Organization of the Review
This chapter presents the literature that informs the project. The chapter begins with a
brief restatement of the research questions and purpose. A thematic review organized in two
major sections follows the introduction. The accounting literature pertaining to the auditing of
public school districts is discussed in the first section. The section begins with a discussion of the
relevant accounting and school business management research prior to 1985. The positive
accounting literature is then reviewed, first covering the demand for auditing in the public school
district market, then literature as it pertains to specific elements of the reform. Because there is
no substantive academic literature pertaining to claims auditing, training of school board
members or corrective actions plans, the scope is limited to external auditor rotation (including
tendering), internal audit, audit committees, and performance auditing. Last in this section, key
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accounting researches on auditees are reviewed. The second major section draws on the
industrial psychology, human resources management and public management literatures. The
section begins with a discussion of the dominant theories of organizational commitment. A
discussion of classic theories based on contract precedes a discussion of commitment theories
based on attitudes. Then, a brief discussion of two psychological constructs that research has
found to be related to organizational commitment, job autonomy and perceived supervisor
support, follows. The section concludes with a review of research about the effects of
administrative reforms on the work attitudes of public employees.
This study considers whether the coercive nature of reform programs implemented in the
public sector to increase financial accountability might result in changes to the work attitudes
held by the civil servants who manage public finances. This is of particular concern in public
school districts, where questions of authority are especially acute (Gutmann, 1987, p. 71).
Specifically, how a select group of school business officials in New York State perceive the
effects of a state-imposed program of accountability reforms featuring a comprehensive audit
program on their work environment will be examined.
Auditing Public School Districts
Early literature. The early literature applicable to the auditing of U.S. public school
districts is oriented toward advancing the practices of accounting and auditing, and widening the
adoption of those practices. Previts and Brown (1993) conducted a content analysis of articles
about government accounting in the United States that appeared in the Journal of Accountancy, a
leading journal in the accountancy field. Their analysis of articles from the journal’s inception in
1905 to 1989 revealed that municipal accounting was a dominant theme between 1905 and 1939
with 74% of the articles published addressing municipal accounting or audit issues (1993, pp.
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124-125). Most of these early works are, however, either technical treatments that address
accounting problems of the day or advocacy pieces. For example, Goodloe (as cited in Previts
and Brown), advocated for a mandatory audit of all public entities in his 1907 article
“Compulsory Auditing of Municipal Accounts.”
It is apparent from the school business literature of the period that auditing had not yet
become a concern of any import for those responsible for school management or governance. For
example, Volume 2, no. 2 of the Review of Educational Research (April, 1932) was devoted to
“Finance and Business Administration” and was intended to review the research between 1923
and November of 1931 (Front Matter). The editors were selective.
“…with the exception of calling attention to the general textbooks,
we shall not take note of the non-research literature. We shall
attempt to do as we have been instructed to do, namely, to review
within the page limits set, only the important literature on the two
topics mentioned above.”
Ward G. Reeder (1932)
The references for each article in the volume were compiled in a bibliography. Of the 449
references in the “Bibliography on Finance and Business Management of Schools” (1932),
fifteen (15) references were listed under a heading called “Fiscal Control and Textbooks in
Business Management of Schools.” Of the fifteen references, five clearly addressed topics
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unrelated to audit, four were the best available school business textbooks7, two were dissertations
comparing school governance structures in fiscally independent and fiscally dependent cities,
and one discussed legal mechanisms to control school expenditures. Only three (3) articles of
the 449 referenced articles, less than one percent, covered a topic related to an audit function,
Each of the three articles used the word “control” in the proper context, or “safeguard” in the title
or description.
Between 1940 and 1979, interest in municipal topics fell sharply, with only 14% of
articles in the Journal of Accountancy addressing municipal accounting topics (1993, p. 130).
Schaefer (1957) described the available literature on school district audits as “limited,” noting
that “very few textbooks or technical journals deal specifically with the topic” and found only
“one doctoral dissertation devoted to audit requirements in a single state and one master’s thesis
concerned with … a particular school fund” (p. 428). A few comprehensive textbooks on school
business management practice were published during this period (see Division of Educational
Management Services, 1955; Knezevich and Fowlkes, 1960; Roe, 1961; Greenhaigh, 1978). A
section on audit is absent from the School Business Management Handbook (1955) series
published by the University of the State of New York, and later texts merely introduce the
concept of audit. While Jordan’s textbook (1969) is a notable exception, this speaks to the
muddled understanding of auditing as applied to public school districts. Knezevich and Fowlkes
(1960) write “Unfortunately there is much confusion in the usage of auditing terminology in
school business affairs” (p. 147). In arguably the first academic treatment of school business

7 Of the four leading textbooks of the day, Engelhardt and Engelhardt's Public School Business Administration
(1927) was the first to appear. Reeder described the text as “the most comprehensive of the four books,
containing thirty-five chapters on the more important phases of the subject (1932, 127).
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management, Roe (1961) prescribes the use of internal audit, external audit and “special
examinations made by the state department of audit or finance” as means to provide adequate
safeguards for public school property (p. 112-114). Previts and Brown attributed the diminished
interest in municipal topics to the rapid growth of federal spending that began immediately
before the Second World War, and continued through the Civil Rights Era and the Cold War
years.
In agency theory, one explanation for why municipalities demand audit services is based
on the “monitoring hypothesis,” whereby agents agree to be monitored when benefits exceed the
monitoring costs (Wallace, 1988). Noting that the rhetoric advocating for governmental
accounting reform in the mid-1970s was very similar to the rhetoric of the early 1900s,
Zimmerman (1977) sought to develop a positive theory to explain why fund accounting was such
a deeply entrenched governmental accounting practice (p. 108). Zimmerman undertook a
theoretical comparison of the agency incentives for voters/stakeholders to bear a higher price for
“complex” monitoring information in both public and private settings. His data included
characteristics of financial statements. He concluded that reforms had not been adopted because
voters do not see a benefit worth the cost of requiring a shift to the full accrual basis of
accounting or consolidated statements.8 Further, Zimmerman suggested that reforms would not
gain traction unless one of three events were to occur: 1) incentives for voters and officials
changed; 2) there was a legal mandate to adopt the reforms, or 3) discovery of fraud or
mismanagement (p. 134).

8 Both have since been required in the GASB 34 pronouncement and implemented during 2001-2002.
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In the mid-1980s accounting research took a decidedly positivist turn, spawning a
substantial literature on the factors that determine demand for audit services within the municipal
audit market, often using school district data. Laws requiring municipal audits would seem to
create an instant demand for audit services. By 1975, forty9 (40) US states had legal
requirements that directly or indirectly required periodic audits of municipalities. Wallace (1988)
conducted a descriptive analysis of accounting and auditing practices of municipalities in the ten
(10) US states without a legal requirement to audit municipalities. She observed that
municipalities in many of those states had engaged a CPA firm to conduct annual audits in the
absence of any legal mandate. Wallace concluded that audit demand exists even when
municipalities are not required to engage an external auditor.
Demand for quality in school district auditing. Two schools of thought support a
rationale for regular audits of public school districts. One research stream advances the argument
that there is economic value in auditing school districts. Using 1995-97 data, Saito and
McIntosh (2010) used econometric methods to study whether auditing effort, measured as time
spent on auditing, reduced nonproductive use of taxes for expenditures in Georgia school
districts and whether complexity added to auditing procedures reduced the expected benefit.
Because 90% of districts were audited by state auditors (p. 13), data on auditing time was
available from the Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts. The relationship between

9 Schaefer (1957) reported that of responses to a questionnaire from chief school officers in 47 US states, two
territories and one possession, 48 indicated “some form” of legal requirement. Therefore, no fewer than 45
states could have such requirements. Wallace (1988) conducted a telephone survey of “knowledgeable
officials” and compared her results with survey results from KPMG and the federal Office of Revenue Sharing
and concluded that 40 US states had legal requirements that directly or indirectly required periodic audits of
municipalities.
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auditing and efficiency was positive and significant at the 0.001 level. The authors also found
that while auditing complexity increased auditing costs, particularly as the proportion of federal
funds increased, there was still a significant net benefit regardless of district characteristics. The
authors concluded that audits conducted by state auditors increased spending efficiency. This
study was also noteworthy because the authors used both data envelopment analysis and
stochastic frontier estimation with consistent results.
Aikins (2011) analyzed survey data collected from a sample of 176 chief local
government auditors to test whether internal auditing practices were correlated to local
government financial performance, defined as the average percentage change in net assets over a
five year period (p. 316). The author reports that “more than 99% of the variation in the
dependent variable representing financial performance is explained by … population, per capita
income, internal control effectiveness and financial performance monitoring” (p. 325). Despite
the extraordinarily high r2 for his models, which suggests model over-specification, the study
contributes to the much needed case that auditing produces economic value in in the school
district market.
The second school of thought supporting a rationale for regular audits of public school
districts is based on the notion that school districts suffer from poor financial management and
must be compelled to comply with accounting and reporting standards. Inspired by the Roslyn
case, Carslaw, Mason & Mills (2007) analyzed data from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse to
investigate which district or audit characteristics might best signal to state-level audit officials
which New York school districts warrant tighter audit scrutiny. Examining five years of Single
Audit data (1998 – 2002), the authors found an alarmingly high incidence of qualified financial
audit reports (32 – 41%) and audit lag (112 - 198 days). Between 9.7 and 15.6 percent of the
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school districts in the sample were also “late filers” (p. 306). Based on their regression analysis,
having the audit conducted by a government auditor, as opposed to a private firm, is positively
associated with increased audit delay. Grant expenditures (i.e. district size), a history of qualified
program or financial audits, reportable conditions or material non-compliance with respect to
either the major program review or internal controls are significantly and positively associated
with audit delay. These findings are not surprising. High-need districts receive a high proportion
of available grant funding, and grant expenditures comprise a larger proportion of a high-need
district’s spending. High-need districts may be less able or willing to make investments in staff
and technology for a non-instructional purpose, or to hire the best auditing firms. As one might
also expect, a school district with at least a three-year history of qualified audits is associated
with increased lag time. The authors conclude that school districts need greater financial
supervision and should be compelled to behave in ways that reduce audit problems (p. 314).
If audits are desirable, it would seem safe to assume that high quality audits are preferred
to audits of lesser quality. Using OLS regression, Deis & Giroux, (1992) examined quality
assessment reports written by Texas Education Agency auditors about audits of independent
school districts (ISD) carried out by local and regional CPA firms. Chief among their
conclusions is that audit quality was not consistent across or within audit firm size categories.
The authors adopted DeAngelo’s (1981) definition of audit quality: the probability that an
auditor will detect material errors in the client’s financial records and then report them.
Deis & Giroux also found that audit quality increases with the number of similar clients,
although the reason could not be determined. In addition, the authors found that financially
healthy school districts receive lower quality audits. On its face this finding seems
unproblematic, even efficient, as investments in additional audit effort are less likely to produce
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commensurate gains in economic or program efficiency in a financially healthy district than in a
financially stressed district. However, low quality audits create opportunities for fraudulent
behavior (Khalil & Lawarrée, 2006), possibly because fewer errors will be found, in turn
resulting in less scrutiny by the board and the public; the malfeasance in Roslyn being a case in
point (Huefner, 2010). Finally, the authors found that audit quality improves with more audit
hours and timely audit reports/less audit delay.
In a follow-up study Giroux, Deis & Bryan (1995) concluded that audit firms provide
higher quality audits when they are subject to peer review. It was inconclusive whether
discounted pricing of initial audits (referred to as “low-balling”) resulted in audits of lower
quality. Further study by Deis & Giroux (1996) using the Texas ISD data set supports prior
research by Deis and Giroux (1992), O’Keefe, King & Gaver, (1994) and Giroux, Deis & Bryan
(1995) in that audit quality is associated with industry expertise unique to the municipal market
segment and audit hours.
In a highly relevant study for this project, Elder & Yebba (2014) drew on data provided
by the New York State Office of the State Comptroller as well as data from the Single Audit
Database to study the impact of the School Fiscal Accountability legislation of 2005 on audit
quality. The final dataset was comprised of 7,763 observations of reportable conditions that
occurred in New York school districts and municipalities between 1998 and 2012. T-tests
compared the incidence of internal control exceptions in cities and school districts before and
after reform implementation. The authors found that school districts experienced significantly
more exceptions post-reform than municipalities. In addition, more low-risk school districts
experienced exceptions and more non-standard (more detailed) audit reports post-reform. These
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are strong indications that the reform has improved audit quality in New York State school
districts.
Modlin (2014) analyzed feedback reports routinely issued by the North Carolina
Department of State Treasurer Local Government Commission (LGC) after their review of
county audits. These so-called “white letters” identify reporting errors and describe generalized
reporting problems. Historically, the LGC issues about 700 white letters per year (Coe 2007).
Modlin found that audit timeliness most strongly predicted the type of reporting problem (2012,
p. 572). He also found that a competitive request for proposal (RFP) was correlated with multiple
findings (2012, p. 571). While Elder & Yebba provide evidence that legislative accountability
reforms improved audit quality for New York school districts, professionally-administered
county governments in North Carolina continue to suffer from reporting issues and errors despite
expansive state oversight of the audit process.
Research on audit-intensive reform strategies. The financial accountability reform
package adopted by the New York State Legislature contained several measures designed to
strengthen the reliability of auditing as an external control including: encouraging external
auditor rotation by requiring periodic tendering of the external audit, requiring an internal audit
function and audit committees, and requiring the Office of the State Comptroller to conduct
audits of school districts. The Office of the State Comptroller calls these audit “performance
audits.”
External auditor rotation. Despite the importance of industry experience for achieving
audit quality, prior research strongly suggests that audit quality for governmental entities is
negatively associated with audit tenure (Catanach & Walker, 1999; Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013).
Several studies show that the risk of a substandard audit, a higher incidence of GAAP violations,
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and audit failure increase with auditor tenure (Copley & Doucet, 1993; O’Keefe, King & Gaver,
1994). This may suggest either complacency (Shockley, 1982) or opportunistic behavior
(DeAngelo, 1981) on the part of the auditor. At face value, these findings suggest that the
governmental efforts to install regulations to mandate auditor rotation are warranted. The
principle being that if goal alignment occurs between auditor and client, auditor independence
will be undermined. However, in presenting a conceptual framework of the constructs to address
the auditor rotation question, Catanach & Walker (1999) demonstrate that the relationship
between audit tenure and audit quality is not a simple linear relationship and in doing so expose a
weakness of these studies. Many variables comprise market structure, economic incentives and
auditor performance constructs, and must be considered (1999: p. 48).
Professional accounting organizations argue that implementing mandatory auditor
rotation would produce substantial and unnecessary monetary and non-monetary costs since
market forces and professional standards enforced by peer review control auditor behavior
(AICPA, 1992). Francis (2011) conducted a literature review of audit quality in which he
contends that the audit failure rate in the U.S., as measured by litigation, is an exceedingly small
0.28%, and therefore finds it “difficult to imagine what can be done to change audit practice or
the regulatory environment that would result in a significantly lower audit failure rate” (p. 347).
Nonetheless, auditor independence is fundamentally important for audit quality and so the merits
of mandatory rotation and less extreme policy options to encourage auditor rotation, such as
audit tendering, continue to be hotly debated (Healey & Kim, 2003, p. 10).
Unfortunately, experience from countries requiring mandatory auditor rotation has not
yet produced sufficient evidence to influence policy in the US, since economic turmoil continues
in Italy, mandatory audit rotation is loosely enforced in Israel and has been abandoned in Spain
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(Catanach & Walker, 1999). More recent research from Asia is only slightly more informative.
Kim and Yi (2009) use regression analysis to study the effect of a regulatory policy in Korea
under which the national regulatory agency may appoint auditors for Korean firms deemed to
have strong incentives to manipulate their accounting statements or engage in suspect behavior
such as opinion-shopping (p. 210). The authors found that the variable representing the rotation
policy was both negatively correlated to the frequency of discretionary accruals and highly
significant. The authors conclude that the policy produces higher quality audits. Firth, Rui and
Wu (2012) exploit the existence of different regulatory regimes in China to examine the effects
of mandatory auditor rotation in that country. The authors conclude that firms with mandatory
audit partner rotations are associated with a significantly higher likelihood of a modified audit
opinion than no-rotation firms. It is important to note that the effect is restricted to firms located
in less developed regions. While these findings may be relevant for developing economies, they
do not shed much light on the problem at hand.
Studies of mandatory auditor rotation in public organizations are rare. One exception is a
study of the Illinois State universities in the context of a mandatory six-year auditor rotation.
Simmons, Costigan & Lovata (2009) compiled audit results of the nine universities conducted
between 1994 and 2005. There were twenty auditor changes during that time. The authors found
that the number of audit findings and repeat audit findings decreased through the six years of the
auditor cycle. Using t tests of matched pairs, the authors found that the number of audit findings
and repeat audit findings increased in the first year with successor auditors.
Internal audit. In their report on the development of the internal audit function in local
government, Friedberg & Lutrin (2001) lament that there had been little research to date on the
internal audit function in the public sector (p. 328). What research had been done focused on
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practice and was conducted by professional organizations such as the AICPA and the
International City Management Association (ICMA). The authors studied the structure,
functions and resources of internal audit operations in a sample of 258 local governments. The
authors found that while organizational nomenclature and position varied greatly, internal audit
operations were charged with three main functions: conducting or supporting traditional financial
audits; conducting or supporting performance audits; and/or correcting errors and abuses (pp.
331, 340-341). The finding that internal auditors conduct performance audits is consistent with
Dittenhofer (2001). Friedberg & Lutrin also found that resources allocated to internal audit by
U.S. local governments were insufficient to carry out their missions effectively when compared
to resources devoted to internal audit operations in Israeli municipalities, judged by the authors
to be leaders in the internal audit field (p.340).
Between June and October of 2008, Aikens (2012) surveyed a sample of 178 audit
department heads identified by the Association of Local Government Auditors to find why
auditees adopt internal auditor recommendations. The author found that despite good working
relations through the audit process, audit clients were not enthusiastic about adopting audit
recommendations, only sometimes implementing action plans by agreed-upon deadlines (p. 210).
The author concludes that audit clients value essentially the same attributes for internal audits as
external audits. Curiously, the study did not include a variable of perceived audit quality (p.
216).
Audit committees. While the Securities and Exchange Commission first proposed audit
committees for the corporate sector in 1940,10 audit committees became required for all publicly-

10 Accounting Circular No. 19.
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traded corporations with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). While there
have been recent calls to mandate SOX-like regulation for the public sector, audit committees
remain optional for a substantial proportion of US local governments (Matkin, 2010). To help
determine the prevalence of audit committees at the local level, West & Berman (2003)
conducted a national survey of cities with populations over 65,000 (N=395). The authors found
that 48% had formed an audit committee in spite of no apparent legal requirement to do so. The
authors provided valuable descriptive data on committee constitution, structure, function and
activities, as well as committee member characteristics.
Matkin (2010) conducted a telephone survey of finance directors in a sample of 195
general-purpose local governments to study the rationale for why local governments form audit
committees. The author describes the study as “preliminary” and provides only descriptive data.
However, the most frequent benefit reported by respondents from cities having an audit
committee was “improved communication between elected and administrative officials (32.8%).
Over a third of the respondents in cities having an audit committee reported no problems with
their audit committee (36.2%). The most frequent problem reported was “difficult to obtain
participation of members (10.3%). Nine cities had dissolved their audit committee for various
reasons.
Fitzgerald and Giroux (2014) conducted a multivariate regression analysis on a sample of
199 US cities with populations of 100,000 or more to develop a model that explains voluntary
audit committee formation in large municipal governments. Five key constructs were represented
in the model: governmental size, form, financial disclosure practices as evidenced by receiving
the GFOA Certificate of Achievement in Financial Reporting, audit characteristics and financial
condition (pp. 69-70). Although their model had good explanatory power, disclosure practices

27

and audit characteristics were not significant in the model. Over 50% of municipalities without
audit committees believed that they had adequate internal controls in place. The authors
concluded that larger municipalities with more resources are more likely to have formed an audit
committee.
Performance auditing. Describing an innovative system of operational audits that was
implemented in Michigan in 1963, Dittenhofer (1971) framed the key functions and features of a
performance audit. A performance audit was understood to be a prescriptive, output-oriented
analysis of operations, conducted for internal as well as external management to determine if an
organization’s actual operations in any functional area are conducted according to established
policy and procedure, and relates them to standards of performance using non-standard methods
designed by the auditor for each audit (1971, pp. 192-194). Dittenhofer also explained that the
audit scope could include the propriety of the policies and procedures in terms of social,
economic and political goals (1971, p. 192). Believing the citizenry to be their ultimate client,
activist auditors began to advance the performance audit as a lever to ensure effectiveness of
public programs (Wheat, 1991). For example, Deck and Levy (1984) suggested that performance
audits might improve the fiscal accountability of public school districts in the United States. In a
meta-analysis that traces the government accounting discourse in the United States since 1980,
Harris (2005) observed, “By 2000, the discourse was portraying performance auditing, not as an
instrument of dramatic change, but as a tool with potential utility” (p. 172).
Because performance auditing can be confused with performance measurement and
program evaluation, some contemporary authors claim that performance auditing lacks
conceptual clarity (Kells & Hodge, 2010, p. 64). Pollitt and Summa (1999) use comparative
analysis to provide a comprehensive description of the purpose and practice of performance
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auditing in five European countries. They found that the scope of performance auditing varies
considerably across jurisdictions, but that performance auditing is a unique process associated
with public management reform. Ter Bogt, (2008) used interviews of Dutch public managers to
conclude that a set of performance-oriented accounting changes implemented in the Netherlands,
while judged to be failures, resulted in behavioral and cultural changes that were consistent with
reform goals. Schelker and Eichenberger (2010) used econometrics to determine that ex ante
reviews of budget proposals by performance auditors will reduce tax rates and expenditures,
especially in larger municipalities.
Segal, (2002, 2004) used the methods of investigative journalism and law enforcement to
study corruption in large urban school systems in the United States. She argued that the similar
patterns of corruption that she found in urban school systems with varying characteristics were
better explained by organizational structure theories than theories of culture. Segal advocated for
a rigorous audit program of performance and compliance auditing as essential for reducing
corruption (p.175). As used by the Office of the New York State Comptroller (2004),
performance audits are “objective and systematic examinations of evidence for the purpose of
providing an independent assessment of the performance of an organization to improve public
accountability and decision-making.”11
Research on auditees. A number of perceptual studies contribute to the audit demand
literature. The most-studied constructs are auditee satisfaction and perceived audit quality.
Lowensohn, Johnson & Elder (2005) surveyed 286 finance directors in the Florida local
governments to test the effect of audit firm specialization on perceived audit quality and auditee

11

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/index.htm
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satisfaction. Their analysis utilized ordinal regression. The authors found that their specialization
variable measured as governmental revenue audited (total dollars) is associated with perceived
audit quality as is their specialization variable measured as total number of governmental entities
audited (audit experience) in the Florida government market. The authors concluded that auditor
specialization is associated with perceived audit quality. Independent variables used in previous
studies such as auditor tenure, planning, manager time and fieldwork are significant in all of their
quality and satisfaction models. While auditor independence and the auditor’s contributions to
the management letter are related to perceived audit quality, they are not associated with auditee
satisfaction. These findings support earlier research that perceived audit quality and auditee
satisfaction are distinct concepts (Behn, Carcello, Hermanson & Hermanson, 1997).
Samelson, Lowensohn & Johnson (2006) conducted a survey of municipal finance
directors to investigate whether their understandings of audit quality were similar to those of the
private sector, which had been established in prior research. The authors used ordinal and OLS
regression analysis to develop a model of perceived audit quality that explains more than half of
the variance (r = .564). The finance directors’ perceptions of audit quality produced very high
correlations for variables indicating auditor competence (Expertise, 1.762; Conduct of
Fieldwork, 1.765; Skepticism, 1.0; Due Professional Care, .947). Equally clear is that the
variable B5 (Big 5) was negatively associated with quality (-.824) in spite of charging higher
audit fees.
Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder & Davies (2007) used regression analysis to examine the
effect of audit firm specialization on the perception of audit quality held by the government
finance officers that responded to the survey. Refining variables used in earlier studies, the
authors found that their composite variable representing audit firm specialization was associated
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with several measures of audit quality and perceived audit satisfaction. This study is particularly
important because it demonstrated that audit firm specialization (experience in the market) was
more important than audit firm size, a variable typically describes the Big 8/6/5/4 firms, for
producing audit satisfaction.
Modlin and Stewart (2014) examined whether involvement of local government staff in
the external audit process produces higher levels of auditee satisfaction in county governments
with commission-manager or council manager forms of government. As in earlier studies, the
authors used ordinal regression analysis. The authors also employed variables used in prior
studies such as audit fees, audit effort, and auditor tenure, including how the auditor was
selected. Perceptual variables measured the finance officer’s satisfaction with the auditor’s
accounting, legal and technical expertise, as well as overall audit satisfaction. Variables not seen
previously measured involvement of the finance director and finance staff. While the model
using all variables was statistically significant (28.05, p ≤ .005), the Psudo-R2 (0.1492) indicates
that the model leaves a substantial amount of the variation unexplained.
By their nature, audits create informational demands for local government and school
district financial managers who, like their private sector counterparts, may accrue penalties to
their reputations and possibly their earnings for poor audit outcomes. For example, Desai,
Hogan and Wilkins (2006) investigated whether there was a reputational penalty for executives
held responsible for violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in their
company’s financial statements. The authors found that GAAP violations often results in
executive turnover and that managers suffer significant penalties when dismissed from firms
after GAAP violations. These reputational penalties include a loss of wealth and a re-hire rate
about half of re-hires from the control group even after controlling for firm performance and
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other factors. No research was found that focuses on reputational penalties that accrue to public
sector financial managers.
One dissertation has specifically explored school business officials’ perceptions of the
effectiveness of the New York School School Fiscal Accountability legislation of 2005. Using a
qualitative research design, Wilner (2008) conducted structured interviews with five school
business officials working in Long Island school districts, asking their thoughts about the
strengths and weaknesses of the reform elements, and their suggestions for improving the fiscal
accountability of public school districts. Based on the responses, Wilner concluded that the
reform elements changed accountability structures, increased monitoring costs and improved
accountability, transparency and oversight (Wilner, 2008, Abstract, unnumbered page).
Sampling school business officials in Long Island school districts was both a strength and
a weakness of the research. School business officials from that region had a unique and valuable
perspective. Though perhaps because the school district financial management scandal was
centered in Long Island school districts, the author found only five school business officials
willing to participate in the study. This may have been because of the newness of the reform
and/or the politically-sensitive nature of any potential statement made about it. Obviously, the
reform impacted school districts across the state. The author herself recommended that similar
studies be replicated in other parts of the state (p. 208). Wilner’s study, while limited, is the only
research found that attempted to directly address the impact of the 2005 New York State reform
program from the perspective of auditees.
Organizational Commitment and Related Constructs
Commitment theories emphasizing contracts. The relationship between the employee
and the organization was of keen interest to “classic” administrative theorists. Chester Barnard’s
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theorizing emphasized the importance of alignment between individual and organizational goals
(Wolf, 1994). While he believed that organizational effectiveness depended on the cooperative
effort of employees, he also believed that an individual’s decision to join and his continued
participation with an organization depends on the employee receiving adequate rewards. When
the inducements received or contributions made fall outside a “zone of indifference,” an
individual is more likely to leave the organization (Barnard, 1938). Similarly, March and
Simon’s (1958) inducements-contributions model recognized that in order for an employee to
continue with an organization, the benefit to the employee must be greater than his costs to
continue. Both theorists tapped into the need for reciprocal exchange in order to limit employee
turnover (Mayer & Schoorman, 1998, p. 17).
Howard Becker (1960) framed the relationship between individual and organization as a
contractual exchange. Much more than a simple “fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay,” Becker
contended that an employee made hidden investments over time that collectively make it more
costly for a person to leave his or her organization than to stay. For Becker, commitment comes
into being when a person links their personal interests outside of work to the employing
organization. Such an investment might be the sacrifice of time, effort or money in order to attain
a comfortable retirement, promotion within the organization, or status in the community. If a
person were to leave the organization prematurely, they would also lose their investments, or
side bets. Awareness of the costs of leaving commits a person to the organization and motivates
them to be productive; productivity being a condition of staying.
The first to empirically test side bet theory, Ritzer & Trice (1969) conducted a national
survey of male personnel managers. A 66.2% response rate was achieved from the 623
questionnaires sent. The authors hypothesized that there would be a direct relationship between
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age, education, marriage, number of children, salary, tenure, and having a sponsor (mentor) to
the manager’s commitment score to either his organization or occupation. The authors did find
that salary was an exception, and concluding that salary was “one of the better indicators of
organizational commitment” (p. 477). However, because most of the correlations the authors
reported were not statistically significant, Ritzer & Trice recommended rejecting side-bet theory.
They theorized that side-bets only strengthen organizational commitment once the commitment
is made. The authors also found that organizational commitment and occupational commitment
were highly inter-correlated.
Cohen & Lowenberg, 1990 conducted a meta-analysis to test Becker’s side-bet theory.
Their study was motivated by a frustration that studies conducted over the previous three decades
shed little light on the validity of the theory (p. 1018). Fifty studies were included as data and the
analysis utilized statistical methods. The authors found no statistically meaningful relationship
between any of the eleven traditional side-bet variables and organizational commitment, and
reported that their findings do not support Becker’s Side-Bet Theory. Importantly, their findings
did not support the commonly-held belief that age and tenure were the best indicators of sidebets (p. 1028).
Wallace (1997) pointed out three problems with the side-bet research published to that
point in time and offered suggestions for improvement. Wallace observed that earlier studies
relied on indirect measures, and suggested that directly measurable firm-related characteristics,
such as hours worked, capture actual side bets better than age and tenure alone. Wallace
observed that there also was conceptual confusion. Specifically, that earlier research attempted to
measure affective commitment as opposed to continuance commitment. Wallace contended that
side bet theory suffered from foci distortion, in that side-bet theory confused attachments to the
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organization with attachments to the occupation (p. 728). Wallace used a regression-based
elaboration model, adding direct measures representing side-bets to the traditional proxies. The
model, based on responses from 593 lawyers employed by a law firm, showed the direct
measures added by Wallace to be statistically significant and to explain more variance. However,
the R2 for the improved models was still fairly low (< 0.19).
Commitment theories emphasizing attitudes. Mowday, Steers, and Porter (1979)
recognized that commitment is comprised of attitudinal components as well as behavioral ones.
They defined organizational commitment as the strength of an individual’s identification with
and involvement in a particular organization. Organizational commitment implies that a person:
believes in the organization’s goals and core values (identification), is willing to exert effort
beyond the minimum required on behalf of the organization (involvement), and has a strong
intent or desire to remain with the organization (loyalty). Although these attachments might
reflect views about the fairness of the rewards (particularly compensation), emotional
attachments are largely based on non-economic considerations. Angle and Perry (1981)
provided empirical evidence of a negative relationship between organizational commitment and
voluntary turnover.
O’Reilly and Chatman (1986) defined organizational commitment as a psychological
attachment felt by the individual for an organization that reflects the degree to which the
individual internalizes the values of the organization. For O’Reilly and Chatman psychological
attachment to an organization results from three commitment processes: compliance,
identification, and internalization. It is important to note that while compliance, identification,
and internalization could occur in stages, it was not a single continuum. Rather they were three
independent processes developing in each person. Compliance occurs when the attitudes and
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beliefs embodied in an organization are adopted by an individual to gain rewards. Identification
occurs when an individual respects the beliefs and values of the organization without necessarily
adopting them as their own. Internalization occurred when the attitudes and beliefs of an
organization are accepted by the individual as her own. O’Reilly and Chatman ultimately
combined identification and internalization, thereby revising their model on two dimensions
called “compliance” and “normative.”
Similar to Mowday, Steers, and Porter, Meyer and Allen (1991) conceptualized
organizational commitment as a psychological construct intended to represent an employee’s
identification, expressed through attitudes, and involvement, expressed through behaviors.
Drawing on three distinct theoretical foundations, Allen and Meyer (1990) constructed their
organizational commitment construct into continuance, affective, and normative dimensions.
This is known as the Three Component Model (TCM) of organizational commitment. Becker’s
side-bet theory is the theoretical foundation for their continuance commitment (CC) dimension.
The psychological attachments of Mowday, Porter and Steers are the basis for the affective
commitment dimension of the model. Weiner (1982) conceptualized commitment as a sense of
moral obligation to act in the best interest of the organization, irrespective of personal benefit (p.
421). A committed person is likely to behave in a manner that benefits the organization because
they would believe that such a course of action is the morally right thing to do.
Citing deficiencies with earlier definitions of the organizational commitment construct
compounded by inappropriate measures, Meyer and Allen published a more complete model of
the TCM in 1991 (Meyer & Allen, 1991). Based on a factor analysis, the authors tested three
eight-item scales: the Affective Commitment Scale (ACS); the Continuance Commitment Scale
(CCS); and the Normative Commitment Scale (NCS). The ACS had correlated (.80) with an
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existing scale to measure organizational commitment, known as the Organizational Commitment
Questionnaire (OCQ). Favorable correlations were reported and supported by subsequent
researchers. Allen and Meyer evaluated the construct validity of the TCM in 1996 and concluded
that the findings both supported the model and the measures (Allen & Meyer, 1996).
A research stream continues to investigate how employees value their side-bets. Rusbult
& Farrell (1983) sought to test an “investment model” with a longitudinal study of turnover in a
sample of 88 moderately professionalized technical workers (accountants and nurses).
Participants completed questionnaires at three month intervals over the course of a year. The
questionnaire items were designed to uncover the differential values of the side bets people make
in terms of rewards, costs, alternatives, and investments. ANOVA testing of responses between
leavers and stayers revealed were as one might expect: Leavers sense lower rewards, higher
costs, and better alternatives. They also believe they have fewer investments to lose. The
author’s multiple regression model was quite strong in predicting turnover when the decline in
commitment measure was added (adjusted R2 = .70). By demonstrating that commitment
effectively constrains a person’s turnover behavior, this research provided strong evidence of a
theoretical link between organizational commitment and employee turnover.
Van Dam (2005) elaborated on Rusbult & Farrell’s model of investments in the context
of involuntary intra-organizational job changes. She surveyed 953 Dutch hospital workers to
assess attitudes toward job change generally. The author modified existing scales measuring job
value, satisfaction, alternatives, investments and commitment in order to capture unique
dimensions of the Dutch public sector (p. 259). In addition, Dutch versions of the affective and
continuance commitment scales were used to measure commitment (p. 259). A key finding was
that important elements of the investment model proposed by Rusbult and Farrell (rewards,
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costs, alternatives, and investments) predicted affective and continuance commitment. However,
the author found that the impact of alternatives and investments was over-shadowed by other
variables. The author attributed that to possible measurement error (p.266).
Criticisms of side-bet theory and the three component model. Side-bet theory has
been criticized from its inception as being a limited view of organizational commitment due to
its apparent emphasis on behavior-shaping structures over psychological attitudes (Shore,
Tetrick, Shore & Barksdale, 2000). In spite of the criticism, research has shown that side-bet
thinking is apparent in commitment theories emphasizing attitudes, particularly Meyer and
Allen’s Three-Component Model (TCM).
Principal components analysis conducted by McGee and Ford (1987) revealed that the
CCS could be disaggregated into two sub-scales reflecting two distinctive risks of leaving: high
personal sacrifice and few alternatives. Exploratory factor analyses on a sample of 182 workers
by Tiang, Granger, Groff, Jackson and Johnson (2011) strongly supported the construct validity
of the high personal sacrifice and few alternatives sub-constructs while Vandenburghe and
Panaccio (2015) explored their psychological bases. The authors report on two surveys of
salaried employees, one conducted a year after the other. The authors yielded 403 responses for
the first survey at Time 1 using a snowball sampling approach. Only 217 of the original
participants submitted the follow-up questionnaire at Time 2. A multiple regression revealed that
those employees who perceived few alternative also had strong feelings of entrapment. The
authors also argued that sacrifice is based on valued ties with the organization such as
employees’ perception of having valuable advantages at their organization (side-bets).
Employees scoring high on the high sacrifice scale would feel resourceful, empowered and
attached. Previously, Powell & Meyer (2004) surveyed community college graduates to test
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whether the two sub-scales to measure continuance commitment were related to any of the sidebet factors. The authors found that all of the side-bet factors correlated significantly with a subscale reflecting high sacrifice continuance commitment and turnover-intention.
Scholars continue to debate whether the affective dimension and normative dimension of
the model are the same. Cohen (1993) argued for a two dimensional model of commitment: one
called the instrumental (economic) dimension and the other called the affective (psychological)
dimension. The findings of a meta-analysis conducted by Meyer, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky
(2002) were generally supportive of the TCM but argued that confirmatory factor analysis did
not resolve a long-standing concern about the overlap of the ACS and NCS, lending ammunition
to scholars who advocate for abandoning the NCS. Culpepper (2011) tested the ability of the
TCM to predict turnover over time. He found that continuance commitment predicts turnover in
the long run and affective commitment predicts short term turnover, but that normative
commitment has little predictive power.
One of the key assumptions in the TCM is that commitment attachments are formed postentry into the organization. Cohen (1993) argued that normative commitment is actually a
propensity – a belief formed prior to entry. A definition of public service motivation (PSM) was
proposed by Perry and Wise (1990, 368) as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives
grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations.” Perry (1996)
operationalized the definition as having four unique dimensions. In their study, Wright,
Christensen and Pandey (2013) tested a five-item global measure of PSM using data sets
compiled from five studies conducted in 2005 through 2010 as part of the National
Administrative Studies Project. The authors found that their global measure of PSM produced
essentially equivalent results as the common multi-dimensional measures for PSM, as well being
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highly correlated to other commonly used attitudinal measures such as job satisfaction. While
research on the PSM construct continues, the authors assert that this research stream has “yet to
produce clear and consistent evidence for a single definitive set of dimensions or measurement
items (p. 198). Moynahan and Pandey (2007) tested whether organizational experience shapes
PSM. Models that included variables suggesting post-entry formation produced R2 ranging
between .15 and .22, indicating that “organization is an important venue for shaping PSM” (p.
46).
Related psychological constructs. Like organizational commitment, job autonomy is
highly correlated to workplace behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover such that the
importance of job autonomy is now widely recognized (Breaugh, 1999). Researchers have used
statistical, experimental, and meta-analytic methods to develop reliable and valid scales to
measure discrete facets of autonomy: (see Breaugh & Becker, 1987; Breaugh, 1999). Those
facets of autonomy are commonly identified as method, scheduling and criteria autonomy
(Breaugh, 1985). Method autonomy refers to a person’s freedom to decide how to do their work;
scheduling autonomy refers to a person’s freedom to decide when to do their work; and criteria
autonomy refers to a person’s freedom to decide how well to do their work.
Cohen (1992) had studied organizational commitment across occupational groups. He
found that relationship of autonomy with organizational commitment was significantly stronger
for white collar occupations (r = 0.46) than for blue collar occupations (r = 0.02), suggesting that
job autonomy is important for the organizational commitment of more educated, higher-paid
government workers.
In their study of auditors employed by public accounting firms, Kalbers and Cenker
(2008) limited the autonomy variable to represent the prerogative of auditors to exercise their
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professional judgement (p. 330). Kalbers and Cenker received 334 usable responses from a
sample of 442 auditors from regional and national firms. The authors tested whether exercised
responsibility, autonomy, role ambiguity, and experience affected job performance. Their results
included findings that autonomy was positively related to job performance and negatively related
to role ambiguity (p. 341).
Somech and Oplatka, (2009) used structural equation modeling to determine that job
autonomy is an antecedent to variables predicting organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs).
Job autonomy has also been studied as a dependent variable. Pearson (1998) used multiple
regression analysis to predict teacher autonomy from two work-related variables: perceived
paperwork load and job satisfaction, as well as attitudinal and demographic variables. The model
produced a correlation coefficient of .49 which accounted for 24% of the variance. Skaalvik and
Skaalvik (2009) used structured equation modeling to discover that autonomy mediated the
relationship between supervisory support and job satisfaction. The strongest correlations among
variables were between supervisory support and autonomy (.41).
In their study of school principals, Chang, Leach & Anderman (2015) used a variable
they called “perceived autonomy support” to represent the degree of decision-making latitude
perceived by the school principals. The authors constructed their instrument from the Work
Climate Questionnaire (Baard, Deci & Ryan, 2004), which in turn was adapted from the Health
Care Climate Questionnaire and the Learning Climate Questionnaire. The authors collected
1,501 responses from K-12 school principals in seventeen U.S. states. Hierarchical regression
analysis was used to test whether the principals’ perception of autonomy was related to their
affective commitment (ß = .55) and demonstrate the predictive power of principals’ affective
commitment (R2 = .38).

41

The perceived supervisor support (PSS) variable is relatively newer and less studied than
the autonomy or commitment constructs. Authors writing in the 1970s and early 1980s
recognized that an employee’s sense of commitment is affected by the exchanges that they
experience in the daily work environment and attributed this connection to a perceived
organizational support (POS) construct. Kottke and Sharafinski (1988) believed that perceived
supervisory support was one of several factors that comprised the more global measure of
perceived organizational support. They modified the scale designed to measure the POS
construct to measure PSS and in validating the scale found that there was little overlap
(correlation of .13) between the two scales. This suggests that PSS is not the same as POS.
Rhodes and Eisenberger (2002) concluded that PSS predicts POS although not all agree. Yoon
and Thye (2002) determined that PSS is both an antecedent and outcome of POS. As with
autonomy and organizational commitment, researchers have recently related the PSS and POS
variables to workplace behaviors such as absenteeism and retention (Dawley, Andrews &
Buchlew, 2008; Eisenberger, Stinglhamber, Vandenberghe, Sucharski & Rhoades, 2002; Maertz,
Griffith, Campbell & Allen, 2007).
The antecedent relationships between job autonomy and organizational commitment and
perceived supervisory support and organizational commitment are well-established and theorists
have incorporated the three variables into larger models. As an example, Brimeyer, Perrucci and
Wadsworth (2010) theorize that a worker’s commitment to an organization is based on
“resources for control” that provide a sense of predictability and control over day-to-day
workplace activities (p. 517).
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Organizational commitment in the public sector. Buchanan (1974) is often positioned
as the genesis of organizational commitment research specific to the public sector. For his study
of why middle managers in the private sector seem to develop stronger attachments to their
organizations than middle managers in the public sector do, Buchanan created a composite
construct of organizational commitment based on identification, involvement and loyalty. He
surveyed 275 managers in large federal government agencies and Fortune 500 companies. His
regression analysis found that seven work experiences accounted for 68 percent of the variance
in the model (R2 = .68). T-tests showed that government managers consistently scored lower on
each of the seven experiences shown to be relevant to commitment. Buchanan suggested that the
difference in organizational commitment between the two groups was rooted in structural
features of public and private organizations (p. 346).
Balfour and Wechsler (1990) specifically tested whether publicness affected dimensions
of organizational commitment. Using the O’Reilly and Chatman measures for commitment, the
authors found that for a sample of 342 operational, supervisory and mid-management level staff
of two public agencies and a privately-owned bank, public sector employees did not have strong
feelings of affiliation, but did have a strong sense of public sector values. These findings
contradicted previous research.
Steinhaus and Perry (1996), applied items from the job autonomy scale developed by
Breaugh (1985) and the organizational commitment scale developed by Meyer and Allen (1991)
to a national sample from the 1991 General Social Survey12 (N=1517). They found that
regression models that included sector as an independent variable did not explain the variance

12The GSS had asked a series of employment-specific questions in addition to the typical questions.
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any better than models that did not include sector as an independent variable. The authors
concluded that organizational commitment of managers in either sectors was not significantly
different (p. 287).
Balfour and Wechsler (1996) sought to develop a model of organizational commitment
anchored in the work experiences of public employees (p .256). The authors engaged in
cognitive mapping prior to surveying a random sample of 828 employees in twelve state
government agencies. A model was developed using LISREL. The model explained 82.8 percent
of the variance in the six dependent organization commitment variables. Most of the
hypothesized casual paths were significant with signs in the expected direction. Importantly,
none of the hypothesized paths from individual characteristics were significant. This is strong
evidence that individual characteristics are not antecedents of organizational commitment as
previously thought. The authors concluded that commitment is influenced by “experiences at
work, the impact of organizational arrangements, and characteristics of the job itself” (p. 271).
Moon (2000) used the National Administration Studies Project (NASP) dataset to
examine relationships of several individual level variables (intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, job
autonomy, goal clarity, managerial level and individual characteristics) and an organization level
variable (sector) with organizational commitment. The sample was drawn from top and middle
managers working in public and private organizations in the upstate New York area, although
there was no particular organizational or policy context. Moon’s multiple regression model for
the public sector had a lower R2 than the private and combined models, but still a high R2 value
(R2 = .41). Moon found intrinsic motivation and job autonomy were particularly important for
public sector managers. He also found a stark difference between upper and middle managers in
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the private sector but virtually no difference between upper and middle managers in the public
sector.
While some work has been done to assess the impact of administrative reforms on
employee attitudes, the research to date only begins to provide what is needed to understand the
workings and effects of administrative reforms on public sector managers. Christensen and
Laegreid (1999) surveyed 2,500 Norwegian civil servants to examine the impact of New Public
Management (NPM) reforms on their lived experience. A key finding was that reforms to
management practice were seen by the civil servants as having the most impact on their work
experience.
Yang and Pandey (2009) studied the effect of perceived political support on normative
commitment in a sample of 274 information technology managers in state-level human service
agencies in the context of results-oriented reforms. The structural equation model developed by
the authors supported a negative association (-.42, p < .001) between bureaucratic structure and
normative organizational commitment of the managers. Importantly, the authors included an
administrative reform (Managing for Results) as a variable. The statistics suggested that the
reform improved goal clarity (.34, p < .001) by reducing bureaucratic structure and improving
communication, ultimately improving normative organizational commitment (.23, p < .01).
Stazyk, Pandey and Wright (2011) tested a model of the effect of institutional context on
the affective dimension of organizational commitment. Managerial and professional employees
in seven public sector organizations located in the northeastern U.S. were surveyed. The authors
received 206 responses. Based on the resulting structural equation model, the authors found that
a unique public sector institutional feature, external control, produces red tape (.47, p < .05).
External control also produces goal ambiguity (.32, p < .05) which in turn produces role
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ambiguity (.67, p < .05), ultimately reducing affective organizational commitment (-.63, p < .05).
While the authors consider their model to be preliminary, they argue that their findings suggest
that the often vigorous external control exerted on public organizations is transmitted to
individual employees, ultimately diminishing their affective organizational commitment (p. 16).
The goal of reform is often to create more accountable governmental institutions
(O’Toole, 1984). However, reforms often produce “red tape,” rules seemingly without purpose,
which can lead to unintended consequences such as higher transaction costs and stress for public
employees (Dunn & Legge, 2000).
Summary of the Literature
The goal of this research is to better understand the perspective of financial managers
working in a specific public sector context toward a set of external controls. Because the
emphasis of the reform of interest is to strengthen the state’s control of school district finances
through various forms of auditing, this review began with the accounting literature pertaining to
the auditing of public school districts and municipalities. The summary of the accounting
literature is followed by a summary of literature pertaining to organizational commitment in the
public sector. In addition to providing useful historical background, the more recent accounting
literature highlights interesting conflicts inherent in principle-agent theory as well as reveals the
competing interests of professions engaged in the public education sector. While the
organizational commitment literature is much more developed in terms of theory and
instrumentation, research on the organizational commitment of public sector employees does not
sufficiently account for the controlled environment that public employees labor in. Together this
literature base provides a starting point for pursuing this problem.
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Summary of the accounting literature. The accounting literature pertaining to auditing
public school districts developed in a logical fashion. Themes in the early literature were
primarily to address technical auditing problems of the day, or to advocate that auditing practices
be implemented more broadly in municipalities. Zimmerman’s 1977 study of incentives to
continue fund accounting practices using an agency framework and DiAngelo’s (1981) definition
of audit quality are important conceptual pieces. As the literature started to become more
positivist, researchers began taking inventories of auditing practices and identifying variables.
Researchers used these variables to explore the relationships governing demand within the
municipal audit market. Some of these studies, such as that of Deis and Giroux, used school
district data to study factors that drive audit quality. As audits of school districts across the
United States have continued to reveal financial control issues, recent research has begun to
focus on mechanisms that can be used to identify school districts with poor financial controls
before a crisis occurs.
The following table summarizes the major accounting studies reviewed that are specific
to auditing of school districts.
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Table 1: Summary of Positive Research on School District Auditing
Author

Focus

Method

Sample

Variables

Findings

Deis &
Giroux,
1992

Do audit firms
deliver audits
of consistent
quality?

OLS
Regression

Errors made by
the auditors

Deis &
Giroux,
1996

What is the
relationship
between
auditor fees,
hours and
quality?

Multiple
Regression

Audit quality
assessment
reports from
Texas
Education
Agency
Audit and
school data
from Texas
Education
Agency

Carslaw,
Mason &
Mills, 2007

Which district
or audit
characteristics
suggest closer
oversight?

Multiple
Regression

1998-2002 NY
school district
Single Audit
data

Qualified audit
reports, Audit
lag (delay),
Late filing

Saito &
McIntosh,
2010

Whether
auditing
reduces
nonproductive
use of taxes
for school
district
expenditures
Comparison of
int. control
exceptions
found in
cities/school
districts before
and after
reform

data
envelopment
analysis and
stochastic
frontier
estimation

1995-97 data
from Georgia
Department of
Audits and
Accounts

auditing effort,
measured as
time spent on
auditing

T-tests

NY school
district Single
Audit data and
data from NYS
Comptroller

Internal control
exceptions

Audit quality was not
consistent across or
within firm size
categories. Wealthier
districts received
lower quality audits.
Audit quality on
initial audits is
associated with
industry expertise
and audit hours (time
spent) but declines
with tenure
School districts have
a high level of
reporting issues.
Gov’t auditors,
district size, history
of qualified audits
are associated with
audit delay
Strong relationship
between auditing and
resource efficiency.
Audit complexity
increased auditing
costs, but still a
significant net
benefit
More exceptions
after reform,
therefore reform
improved audit
quality

Elder &
Yebba,
2014

The accounting research provides less guidance with respect to the application of four
key reform initiatives: encouraging external auditor rotation through tendering, internal audit,
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audit committees, and performance auditing as they are applied to school districts. The table
below summarizes the major studies reviewed that are specific to state and/or local government.

Table 2: Summary of Research on External Auditor Rotation or Tendering,
Internal Audit, Audit Committees and Performance Auditing
Author

Focus

Method

Sample

Variables

Findings

Simmons,
Costigan &
Lovata, 2009

External
auditor rotation

Match-pair
T-tests

Illinois State
universities

Number of findings
increased during the
first year of the sixyear cycle and
decreased over the
full six years

Modlin, 2012

Factors
influencing
audit findings
External
auditor rotation
Structure,
function and
resources of
internal audit
operations
Adoption of
internal auditor
recommendatio
ns
Voluntary audit
committee
formation

Survey,
Logistic
regression

N. Carolina
county gov’ts

Audit
findings
during a
mandatory
auditor
rotation
program
Reporting
errors noted
in audit
quality
assessments
Uncorrected
reporting
errors

Application of
performance
auditing to
budget reviews
and impact of
such auditors
on fiscal policy
at the Swiss
local level

OLS
Regression

Friedberg &
Lutrin, 2001

Aikens, 2012

Fitzgerald &
Giroux, 2014

Schelker &
Eichenbrger,
2010

258 US local
governments

Survey

Multivariate
regression
analysis

178 heads of
municipal
audit
departments
Large
Presence of
(100,000+
an audit
pop.) US cities committee

Largest Swiss
municipalities

Tax rates

A competitive RFP
was correlated with
multiple audit
findings
Resources allocated
to internal auditing
in the US is
insufficient
Audit clients are
slow to implement
auditor
recommendations
Larger, more
financially viable
cities are more
likely to have audit
committees
Performance
auditing reduces tax
rates and
expenditures,
especially in larger
municipalities
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Finally, auditees are considered in some accounting studies. However, these studies
explore the auditees’ perceived audit quality or their satisfaction with the audit. The accounting
research does not address organizational commitment of auditees.
Summary of the organizational commitment literature. Attracting and retaining
skilled labor during a period of rapid growth was a problem for American industries, particularly
in the post-war years. Theorists of the time reasoned that the relationship between employee and
organization was essentially a problem of inducements and reciprocal exchange. Theorists
developed theories that framed organizational commitment as a contract. Becker’s Side-bet
theory, published in 1960, remains the most prominent of these theories. Later theorists
recognized that commitment included attitudinal components. The most important attitudinal
model to be developed is Meyer and Allen’s Three-Component Model. While both Side-bet
theory and the Three-component model have been criticized, neither has been debunked. The
following table summarizes the major studies related to organizational commitment in the public
sector.
Table 3: Summary of Public Sector Organizational Commitment Research
Author

Focus

Method

Sample

Variables

Findings

Buchanan,
1974

Why middle
managers in the
private sector
develop stronger
attachments than
managers in the
public sector.
Does “sector”
explain
commitment
differences
between public
and private
employees

Regression
analysis of
survey data

275 managers
in federal
government
agencies and
Fortune 500
companies.

Demographic
and
organizational
characteristics
and work
experiences

Difference is
rooted in
structural
features.

Regression
analysis of
survey data

National
sample from
1991 GSS

From
established job
autonomy and
organizational
commitment
scales

No significant
difference
between public
and private
employees.

Steinhaus
& Perry,
1996
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Balfour &
Wechsler,
1996
Moon,
2000

Yamg &
Pandey,
2009

Stazyk,
Pandey &
Wright,
2011

Develop model
of
organizational
commitment
Examine
relationships
between
individual-level
and
organizationallevel variables
Perceived
political support
in context of
results-oriented
reforms

Cognitive
mapping,
survey,
LISREL
Multiple
regression

828 state
government
employees

Sector, work
experiences

Individual
characteristics
not significant.

NASP dataset

Motivation, job
autonomy, goal
clarity and
sector

Intrinsic
motivation and
job autonomy is
important for
public sector
managers

Structural
Equation
Model

274 IT
managers in
state-level
human service
agencies

Normative
commitment,
Managing for
Results

Tests a model of
affective
organizational
commitment
that captures
institutional
context

Structural
Equation
Model

206 public
sector
managers and
professionals
working in
northeastern
US

Bureaucratic red
tape, goal
ambiguity, role
ambiguity,
centralization,
affective
commitment

Negative
association
between
bureaucratic
structure and
normative
commitment.
External control
produces red
tape, goal and
role ambiguity,
leading to
reduced affective
commitment.

While both the accounting and organizational commitment literatures both provide a
helpful foundation for this project, gaps exist in both literatures. Accounting research on the
positive and negative effects of various audit-intensive reform strategies as applied in the public
sector is scarce. Conceptual work on performance auditing in the U.S. is especially important
given increased interest shown by U.S. state governments in using performance auditing as a
means to control distant agents. Additional studies to explore the perceptions of auditees relative
to audit satisfaction and quality are also useful, especially considering that DiAngelo’s definition
of audit quality demands that auditors report an increasing number of findings that are likely to
have less and less import as time progresses. Controversies continue in the organizational
commitment literature over the relative importance of continuance (investments), and the overlap
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of affective and normative commitment. As applied to the public sector, scholars are only
beginning to focus on the unique effects of external controls on public managers.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
Research Design
The aim of this exploratory, multi-subject qualitative study is to gain insight about how
auditees in public organizations experience and think about external controls that feature an
extensive regimen of auditing. The individual participant is the unit of analysis. The central
research question to be explored is “how do select public school district business leaders perceive the
effects of a recent financial reform program on the psychological attachments that bind them to their
organizations?” The following sub-questions serve to guide the exploration of different aspects of the
central research question.
3. How do these leaders describe and explain the effects of the reform on their work
environment, activities and relations?
4. How do these leaders describe and explain the effects of the reform on their professional
identities, motivations and commitments?

Strauss and Corbin (1998) defined qualitative research as any kind of research producing
findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification (p.17).
In addition, the authors indicated that the analysis used in this type of research will involve a
nonmathematical analytic procedure that results in findings derived from data gathered by a
variety of means (p. 18).
Grounded theory refers to theory that is developed inductively from a corpus of data
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Glaser and Strauss, are thought to have a positivist orientation,
particularly Glaser (Charmaz, 2003). The general approach taken in this project for this project is
consistent with an “evolved” grounded theory positioned more closely to the constructivist
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grounded theory of Charmaz (2006) than to the positivist orientation of Glaser (1992) or even
Strauss and Corbin (1994).
According to Mills, Bonner & Francis (2006), grounded theory positioned in this manner
allows for points of departure along a methodological spiral depending on the researcher’s
ontological beliefs (p. 2). While constructivism denies the existence of an objective reality,
evolved grounded theory accepts that many social constructions will be shared (Guba & Lincoln,
1989, p. 43). Constructivism also relies primarily on inductive data collection. Because
perceptions are endogenous to each person, shaping and limiting their actions, important issues
will emerge from the stories told by the participants. However, evolved grounded theory allows
engagement with the literature and so recognizes that researchers will have pre-existing ideas.
Strauss & Corbin (1998) encouraged engaging with the literature from the beginning of the
research process (p. 45). Finally, constructivism emphasizes the co-construction of meaning that
results from the researcher’s interpretive interaction with the participant and data. Strauss and
Corbin (1998) recognized that the researcher must have the capacity to “separate what is
pertinent from what isn’t” (p. 44). Creswell (2005) states that a grounded theory design is
appropriate when the research intent is to modify a theory (p. 411).
The method for the analysis is based on the constant comparative method pioneered by
Glaser and Strauss (1967) using the “purposeful” approach described by Boeije (2002, p. 392).
Boeije argues that the constant comparative method is not limited to studies of individuals and
dyads within the confines of psychological research, and can be applied to a variety of qualitative
methods. O’Connor et al. (2008) stated:
It must be clear that constant comparison, the data analysis
method, does not in and of itself constitute a grounded theory design.
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Nor does the process of constant comparison ensure the grounding of
data whether “grounding” is used in a positivistic or interpretive sense.
Simply put, constant comparison assures that all data are
systematically compared to all other data in the data set. This assures
that all data produced will be analyzed rather than potentially
disregarded on thematic grounds (p. 41).

Description of the Participants
Sixteen school business officials (SBOs) practicing in public school districts in New York

State were recruited for the study. All were adults who used English in the workplace. Participants
were neither coerced nor compensated. Of the sixteen, three did not respond to my solicitation,
two initially agreed but ultimately declined to be interviewed, and one withdrew after being
interviewed. The participation rate was 62.5%.
Consistent with the theoretical sampling guide found in Draucker, Martsoff, Ross & Rusk

(2007, p. 1141), the first study participants were identified based on broad selection criteria. To be
eligible for participation, a person must have been in charge of the financial management of a public
school district in New York State, excluding New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Yonkers or
Syracuse (aka “the Big 5”), during at least one audit by the Office of the State Comptroller under the
auspice of the local government and school accountability legislation passed in 2005. A person
would be eligible to participate whether those experiences were acquired in the same or different
districts. While the “big 5” districts listed above are subject to the reform legislation, their political
and fiscal environments are markedly different than suburban and rural school districts.

In their review of qualitative studies related to health care, Draucker, Martsoff, Ross &
Rusk (2007) reported that authors most commonly used theoretical sampling to: select
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participants with certain characteristics; modify interview questions; and direct the researcher to
data sources other than the participant narratives. After an interview was concluded, participants
were asked if they could recommend colleagues who might contribute to the study. Because
participants often initially suggested potential participants with characteristics similar to
themselves, the researcher suggested characteristics such as gender, career path, or geographic
region that had not been well-represented to that point. Not all suggestions were pursued. The
following table presents a summary of participant characteristics that were used as criteria for
theoretical sampling decisions.
Table 4: Summary of Participant Characteristics and Sampling Criteria
Participant

Gender

Qualification

CPA

Region

Sampling Criteria

A

Male

Certificate

CPA

Met broad selection criteria

B
C
D
E
F

Male
Male
Male
Male
Female

Certificate
Civil Service
Civil Service
Certificate
Certificate

CPA

Southern
Tier
Central NY
Capital
Capital
Capital
Capital

G

Female

Civil Service

CPA

Capital

H

Female

Certificate

Capital

I
J

Female
Male

Certificate
Civil Service

Capital
North
Country

Met broad selection criteria
Met broad selection criteria
Snowball
Snowball
Theoretical – Female, Cert,
CPA
Theoretical – Female, non-cert,
CPA
Theoretical – Female, Cert, No
CPA
Theoretical – Female
Theoretical - Region

After meeting the broad selection criteria to be included in the study, the first three
participants were not referred by a previous participant. The fourth and fifth participants were
recruited in a snowball manner from a participant’s referral. Because the first five participants
had been male, and females are known to hold school business positions, sampling became more
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strategic to include females. Females with different qualifications were selected to produce
additional variation.
The primary data collection technique employed for the study was semi-structured
interviewing. While interviewing can be considered a qualitative method unto itself (Seidman,
2006), the role of interviewing in this study is limited to two key functions. The first is to serve
as the primary data collection vehicle. The second is to guide theoretical sampling decisions.
Participants were recruited through direct email or telephone contact according to a script
approved by the University’s IRB (Appendix B). Once a person agreed verbally or by email, a
recruitment letter including the consent form (Appendix C) and a list of interview questions was sent.

The decision to send the interview questions to all participants was made while scheduling the
very first interview. Participant #1 requested the interview questions in advance so that s/he
would have time to prepare thorough responses and suggested that the other participants would
also appreciate having the interview questions in advance. During the interviews several
participants referred to their list of questions after making initial responses stating that they
wished to verify that they covered all of the points they wanted to make. Only one participant
indicated that s/he did not look at the questions at all prior to the interview session. Releasing the
questions in advance was an acceptable field adaptation of the research plan because it assuaged
concerns of skeptical participants that the questions would be embarrassing. Addressing the issue
in this manner increased the likelihood of rich, thoughtful responses.
Role of the Researcher
In qualitative research, the research is considered an instrument of data collection (Denzin &
Lincoln, 2003). It is incumbent upon the researcher to describe relevant aspects of self, including
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biases, assumptions, expectations and experiences to qualify the researcher’s ability to conduct the
research study being contemplated (Greenbank, 2003).

The researcher undertaking this project is a middle-aged, white male who is a product of
a highly-ranked graduate program in public administration. He has nearly thirty years of
professional experience in public financial management in New York State local government,
the state university system, and public school districts. This extended, practical experience
provided a deep understanding of the technical work, its challenges and demands, and the work
environment, including its political contexts. In the researcher’s view, the additional auditing
effort associated with the reform of interest has produced little of value in cost/benefit terms.
Implementation can be disruptive, thereby producing short-term organizational inefficiencies.
Finally, audit regimes can be politically-motivated and therefore the legitimacy of a reform is
inherently suspect. On the other hand, it is possible that the additional auditing effort associated
with the reform of interest may have improved democratic governance in substantive ways.
While the proposed theoretical model is based on the literature, it is also consistent with an
expectation that the intensification of monitoring associated with this reform would be of great
concern to practicing school business officials, and ultimately would produce evidence to
support lessening of commitment.
While insider knowledge can be an asset, it also blurs the researcher’s positioning. While
three of the participants were professional acquaintances, it wouldn’t be fair to say that the
researcher was a full participant in the phenomenon. Therefore the researcher’s positioning is
etic – as an outside observer. The semi-structured nature of the interview helps to reduce
distortion caused by the interviewer’s interpretive process. Distortion is reduced further with
practice by the interviewer (Wengraf, 2001).
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Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection. Data were obtained through semi-structured, interviews conducted in the
summer of 2014. Questions were open ended and provided opportunity for the interviewer to probe.
The interview guide used for the interviews appears in Appendix D. The tone of the interviews was
conversational as one might expect from a conversation between colleagues. Not every participant
was asked every question. Depending on the pace and direction of the conversation, a listed question
may have been skipped. This was an acceptable compromise, since participants sometimes covered a
topic in advance of an upcoming question.

Interviews averaged 67 minutes 10 seconds in duration, with the shortest being 44
minutes 12 seconds and the longest being 96 minutes 24 seconds. All but one interview was
conducted face to face at the participant’s district office. The remaining interview was conducted
over the telephone. While concerns about conducting interviews via telephone have been refuted

(Novick, 2008), the telephone interview was the shortest of the interviews conducted for this
project. This suggests that the telephone could be a barrier to establishing a rapport with an
interview subject. Nonetheless, this was an acceptable compromise since using the telephone in
that instance allowed a person who lived and worked a great distance away to participate in the
study.

The interviews were recorded on a digital recording device. The audio files were
personally transferred by a cable to a desktop computer attached to a secure university network.
Audio files were copied to a flash drive and delivered to one of three paid transcribers. The flash
drives were either delivered personally or sent by a package delivery or U.S. Postal Service. The
transcribers returned the flash drives in the same fashion. Audio files and transcripts were
retained on a flash drive kept in a locked box and will be destroyed when the study is complete.
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Once transcripts were received from the transcribers, they were sent to the participants to
review. In spite of requesting that they affirm that the transcript was accurate, most of the
participants did not comply. Three participants sent minor corrections, usually the correct
spelling of the proper name of a person, audit firm or school district. At this stage, one
participant withdrew from the study.
On two separate occasions, both early in the interview schedule, two interviews were
conducted on the same day. Since there was no time to conduct analysis between interviews,
theoretical sampling was weakened. Theoretical sampling was also weakened when interest in being
interviewed out-stripped the transcriber’s capacity to produce transcripts. However, these were
necessary compromises to accommodate scheduling and travel. This was less of a problem later in
the interview schedule.

One of the main limitations of interviews is data being filtered by subjects. Filtering data
was a particular concern for this study for two reasons. First, subjects needed to recall issues and
events that took place years prior to their interview. Second, it may be socially desirable to
present the district in a favorable light or to downplay real or perceived shortcomings in their
personal job performance. While recalling issues and events did not seem to be at all difficult for
the participants, two incidents during the interviews suggest that social desirability might have
been at play. In one interview, the participant staged an interruption. Early in one interview, an
administrative assistant came into the office with a textbook and a contrived question about a
bond issue. After the display, the participant stated that the display was intended to demonstrate
how busy school business officials were. While the display was likely intended to impress a
younger, more inexperienced interviewer, it did not have that effect. Nor did the display
undermine the credibility of the interview. It is simply data. In a different interview, the
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participant declined to be directly critical of the reform and instead phrased his criticism in
positive language, stating that the response was “making lemons into lemonade.” Again, this did
not undermine the credibility of the interview. Rather, the response and explanation was data to
be analyzed and interpreted.
Process of analyzing the data. Provisional coding establishes a pre-determined set of
codes with which to begin an inquiry (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The provisional codes may
be based on a variety of pre-fieldwork activities including literature searches, pilot studies,
research questions and researcher-generated hunches about what the data to be collected will
reveal (Saldaña, 2011). Because this research begins with a model depicting a set of theoretical
relationships, the relationships can be said to represent researcher-generated hypotheses or
hunches about what the data to be collected will reveal. As such, provisional coding is an
appropriate first-cycle coding method for this study. The following set of provisional codes were
derived from the theoretical model:
1. District Variables: Size; Wealth
2. Reform Package: External Audit; Internal Audit; Claims Audit; Audit Committee;
Corrective Action Plan; Board Financial Training, and; Performance Audit;
3. Adapted District Structures
4. Audit Variables: Frequency; Focus; findings
5. Perceived Supervisor Support
6. Job Autonomy: Method; Schedule; Criteria
7. Organizational Commitment: Continuance; Affective; Normative
In addition, several provisional codes related to the individual school business official were
added including:
1. Tenure – Career; Current
2. Qualification Type – Certificate; Civil Service; Other
3. Gender – M; F
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4. Prior Work Experience – Public; Private
5. Entry Age
6. Region - Current

The provisional codes do not encompass all possible district and individual-level
characteristics or constructs. Rather they include only those district and individual-level
constructs theorized in the model presented in Chapter 1 along with a few additional descriptive
characteristics. Nor is the goal to force the data into the provisional codes. According to Glaser
(1992) if a researcher believes that the product of their analysis is a reconstruction of their own
making, using techniques that reveal pre-conceived ideas is not forcing the data. The provisional
codes were helpful in that they provided an initial scheme for categorizing responses. However,
it is common for provisional codes to be added, modified or deleted as the study progresses
(Saldaña, 2011).
Coding the first transcript is a critical step when using the constant comparative method
because it produces several important outputs on which future coding iterations are based. These
include a summary of each interview, a list of preliminary codes, and notes describing the coding
process (Boeije, 2002). Each sentence in the first transcript was read carefully for content and
meaning. An open coding scheme was then used to generate codes to supplement the provisional
codes. A single, hand-written, word or phrase-length code was assigned for every segment of
text that seemed interesting, regardless of the segment length and whether it was repeated or not.
This approach is more discrete than “lumper” coding, but less discrete than “splitting.” Saldaña
characterizes this approach as “middle-order” holistic coding (2011, p. 118). From the transcript
marked up with the draft codes, a list of the preliminary codes was compiled and grouped
together if the codes seemed to be analogous or very closely related.
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Apparent discrepancies between codes assigned to similar text segments were resolved
by re-reading the text to better understand the context and re-coded accordingly. As an example,
a participant made two apparently conflicting statements in the text. Twice s/he referred to the
job as “complicated, difficult work.” Later in the interview, s/he stated that school business
management “isn’t as mysterious as people think.” A close reading of the transcript revealed that
the context of the first statement is about negotiating politically-charged situations, the second
refers to completing financial tasks. This instance resulted in creating two codes; one related to
perceived difficulty with politics and the second related to perceived difficulty of financial work.
As each transcript was coded, the preliminary codes were added to the list and evaluated for renaming or consolidation with another code.
A summary of each transcript was then written in Microsoft Word in a narrative
organized to address each code found in a transcript. The average length of the summaries was
four and a half pages. This process eliminated many duplicate segments and screened out some
segments that, on reflection, didn’t seem to fit the project. One concern however, is that the
summarizing process reduced the data by about 70% on average, which is higher than the 50%
that Seidman (2006) suggests as a standard. Preliminary codes were inserted as headings
between paragraphs. These became preliminary codes.
Since the research questions deal with perceptual phenomena, specifically how
participants think and feel about an audit program intended to improve financial accountability, a
values coding scheme was utilized for the axial coding process. Rokeach (1969) described a
value as a deeply embedded belief about how one ought or ought not to behave; attitudes as
being the positive or negative emotional feelings a person holds towards some object or idea
predisposing a person to respond in a consistent way; and a belief as being an idea that a person
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holds to be true. Beliefs may be descriptive (“I believe that the auditors were on site for two
months”), evaluative (“I believe that the reform did more harm than good”) or prescriptive (“I
believe that the auditors should stop being confrontational”). Collectively, values, attitudes and
beliefs reflect a person’s perspectives and world-views (Saldaña, 2011, p. 89).
Codes representing whether a segment reflected a value, attitude or belief were applied to
the interview summaries. In many cases it was difficult to ascertain whether a segment reflected
a value, attitude or belief. In those cases, a “best guess” was taken. This was an acceptable
approach since the goal of the project is not to differentiate between values, attitudes or beliefs or
to show how values affect attitudes and beliefs. To improve accuracy, code choices were verified
by finding one or more references in the interview transcript, re-reading and verifying that the
code choice was reasonable. For ease of data handling, the coded segments of text from each
interview were transferred into an Excel workbook and matched with the appropriate code. This
process was repeated for each transcript, with the coded segments and codes placed in a separate
tab in the Excel workbook. Once the values coding process was completed for all ten interviews,
there were forty two (42) surviving codes.
From this set of codes and coded segments of text, straight-forward techniques described
by Ryan and Bernard (2003) were used, particularly word repetition and word lists derived from
the literature (pp. 96-97) and the cutting and sorting technique (pp. 94-96), which was used even
more extensively than the word techniques. Analytical summaries were written to begin the
process theme development. Illustrative quotes from the transcripts were selected and included in
the analytical summaries. The forty two (42) surviving codes were reduced to eighteen (18)
categories. The categories were tentatively named as follows:
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1. Participants
2. Management vs. Performance
3. Feeling Valued
4. Comments on Preparation
5. Relationship w/Superintendent
6. Job Autonomy
7. Accountability and Risk
8. Frequency and Focus
9. Picking Your Battles
10. Surviving an Audit
11. Impressions of Accountability Reform
12. External Audit
13. Internal Audit
14. Claims Audit
15. Audit Committee
16. Financial Training for Board Members
17. Impact on SBO Role
18. Success

Reducing the eighteen categories to five themes was aided by interconnecting the
categories as described in Creswell (2005, p. 246). Initially, the themes that emerged were
cryptically named. But on further consideration, the themes were renamed to reflect a
chronological progression: 1) Becoming Established, 2) Assessing Reform and 3) Surviving the
Reform.
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Table 5: Categories and Themes

Cat Cat Name
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Participants
Management vs. Performance
Feeling Valued
Comments on Preparation
Relationship w/Superintendent
Job Autonomy
Accountability and Risk
Frequency and Focus
Picking Your Battles
Surviving an Audit
Impressions of Accountability
Reform
External Audit
Internal Audit
Claims Audit
Audit Committee
Financial Training for Board
Members
Impact on SBO Role
Success

Becoming
Assessing
Surviving
Established Accountability Reform
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Examples representing how the data was coded and compiled at major steps in the
process are provided in Appendix E. Examples are provided to show 1) how codes were applied
to the corpus for each participant; 2) how narrative summaries for each participant were coded
with values coding; 3) how the codes were compiled and organized into categories. The
remaining examples demonstrate how data for all participants was aggregated and themed.
Validity steps. Steps were taken during data collection to limit the possibility of bias.
The semi-structured nature of the interview reduces the risk of researcher bias (Weingraf, 2001).
To ensure that the interview data was accurate, typed transcripts were sent to the participants for
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their review. Relevant statements in the participants’ stories were reviewed for consistency with
the official audits available on the Office of the State Comptroller website. A data base created
for coding audit foci includes links to retrieve all OSC audit reports. While providing key
findings to subjects (member-checking) is desirable because it improves the validity of the study
(Creswell, 2009), few of the participants complied with the request to verify the accuracy of their
transcripts. Therefore it seemed unlikely that the participants would respond in sufficient number
to improve the study.
The AtlasTi qualitative data analysis software was used to guide and validate the
selective coding process by analyzing word counts in the corpus. While the word list was not
used in a prescriptive fashion, many of the most frequently used words on the list did relate to
the themes identified.
The University’s Institutional Review Board determined that the research posed no more
than minimal risks to the participants. Conversely, participants were neither compensated nor did
they derive any other benefit.
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Chapter 4 – Data Analysis and Results
The aim of this exploratory, multi-subject qualitative study is to gain insight about how
auditees in public organizations experience and think about financial accountability mandates. Of
particular interest is how intensified external controls might affect the psychological attachments
that bind the auditees to their organizations. Following an introduction that reminds the reader of
the purpose statement then describes the participants, the findings of the study are presented
under three themes, named “Becoming Established,” “Assessing Reform,” and “Surviving the
Reform.” Within themes sub-themes are identified by headings.
Unless the exact number was used, consistent language was used in the narrative to
describe the number of the participants who responded in like manner such as expressing a
particular belief. For example, “almost all” of the participants means that nine (9) of the ten or
90% of the participants responded in that manner.
Table 6: Narrative Expression of Participant Counts
Language

x of 10 Percentage

All

10

100%

Almost All

9

90%

A Clear Majority

8

80%

A Majority

7

70%

More than Half

6

60%

Half

5

50%

Less than Half or Some

4

40%

A Few

3

30%

A Clear Minority

2

20%

Almost None

1

10%

None

0

0%
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The ten individuals (6 male; 4 female) participating in the study were practicing School
Business Officials (SBOs) in public school districts in New York State. A majority (70%) of the
participants were drawn from the Capital Region, an 11-county area around Albany, NY, with
the remaining three, one from each region, representing the Southern Tier, Central New York
and the North Country. However, their collective experiences over the course of their careers
encompass a much larger geography, covering virtually the entire state including Long Island.
Figure 2: Regions of New York State
1 Western New York
2 Finger Lakes
3 Southern Tier
4 Central New York
5 North Country
6 Mohawk Valley
7 Capital District
8 Hudson Valley
9 New York City
10 Long Island
Theme One: Becoming Established
Pre-service, entry and movement. Almost all (90%) of the participants were on a
trajectory leading toward a career in the private sector; either studying a business field as an
undergraduate or earning an MBA degree. Eight began their professional careers in the private
sector, most often doing accounting work. Of the eight who began their professional careers in
the private sector, three became Certified Public Accountants (CPA) and pursued careers in
public accounting. Two more rose to become the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in private firms.
With the exception of one participant who changed fairly quickly from private business to public
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school teaching, and another that entered the civil service after only a few years in the private
sector, those that began a career in the private sector persisted for more than a decade. Whether
motivated by industry re-structuring, family considerations, or a career choice, these individuals
eventually engaged in information-seeking to explore school business as a career opportunity.
While one participant characterized their own entry into the field as “just kind of fell into it”
others were more strategic: “I knew that “once in, I could count on continuous work.”
For a majority (70%) of the participants, the position held immediately prior to their first
position as a school business official was a civil service position either in state/municipal
government (n = 2) or in a large school district/BOCES13 (n = 5). Each path provided the
opportunity to acquire specialized knowledge of municipal law and school finance. These
participants affirmed the importance of being well acquainted with the specialized knowledge
prior to taking on the responsibility of the school business official role.
“…my father was a retired assistant superintendent
of business ... He was doing consulting work, and he said to
me, why don't you come along … on my next job and see if
you like this or not? So we went out to _______ because
they go through business officials like laundry. We went to
Board meetings, I did some presentations. Well, then <his
father> got sick. I finished the budget, did the Board
presentation, and they then hired me as interim (SBO).”

13 In 1948 the New York State legislature created Boards of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) to
provide shared educational programs and services to school districts within the state. BOCES are organized
regionally and provide services to member districts.
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Another related:
“(I) was (in <local> government) for <a
substantial number of> years as comptroller so that was
where I built the base of all of my knowledge on local
finance law, general municipal law requirements of the
state comptroller’s office and all of the patchwork of
laws and regulations that affect local governments.
Through that position I had worked on some joint
projects with the assistant superintendent for business at
the school district…”

Figure 3: Participants’ Paths to the SBO Position

Private Sector

College Education in Business

Teaching

Civil Service

Consulting

Graduate
School

School Business Official
Role
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A clear majority (80%) of the participants held the school business official position in
another district before accepting their current post. Four of the eight moved from a smaller
district to a larger one. One participant indicated that s/he held SBO positions in three districts
before landing the “pinnacle among SBO positions in the region.” The other four who held the
school business official position in another district before accepting their current post left a
position in an urban district to take a position in a suburban district. A participant stated: “city
districts are tough places and plagued with old-time politics. If an SBO gets an opportunity to
leave, it isn’t a tough decision to go.”
Negotiating responsibilities. All of the participants emphasized the importance of
achieving a balanced budget. The participants had a collection of budget models that they
regularly update and use for projecting revenue receipts and rates of spending as the year
progresses. School business officials are also asked to meet unexpected needs and to use
opportunistic savings to best advantage. As one participant put it, “you have limited resources
and infinite demands.” So:
“You don't sit on the (money) ... Um, because
you can just … keep it and put it to fund balance or put
it in the reserve. I like to look at the whole (operation)
and see where we need (additional resources) to keep
things going… What can you do with this $10,000?”
While all of the participants emphasized the importance of achieving a balanced budget
only half (50%) of the participants expressed feeling a high degree of responsibility for actually
achieving a balanced budget.
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“Oh, (I feel) 100% responsible. The only caveat
I'll put to that is if the Board of Education and the
superintendent have an undue influence or want to have
an undue influence on the finances, then … I talk to
them about it. … I feel fully responsible, but there are
some things that a superintendent or a Board may want
to do (that) I don't have any problem, like I said,
leaving a district...”
Similarly, half (50%) of the participants do not feel particularly responsible for the
district’s financial performance/condition. Financial condition reflects the overall financial
capacity to sustain its programs and/or to pay its debts (Reed & Swain, 1990: 304). A
consequence of receiving a poor evaluation of financial condition is paying higher interest rates
on borrowed money needed to purchase safe buses or for investments in facilities.
“I don’t feel as much responsible (for the
district’s financial performance). I feel responsible for
day to day operations. As far as performance, that’s
bigger, that’s a joint responsibility with the board,
superintendent and the community to decide where
they want the district to be (fiscally) …”
All of the participants expressed a strong sense of responsibility for assessing and
communicating important information to the superintendent and school board. While school
business officials may not feel completely responsible for financial performance outcomes, they
continuously scan the changing legal, political, and financial environments.
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“It's my job to communicate the financial aspect
of what's happening. Nobody else. It's not anybody
else's job.”
All of the participants expressed that they feel responsible for the operation and
maintenance of procedural systems used to manage transactions. Much of a school district’s
transaction volume is of a routine nature. The proper handling of routine financial transactions
depends on systems engineered with checks and balances and embedded internal controls to
reduce the chance of error.
Looking back at preparation. All of the participants agree that the SBO position is a
financial role embedded in a political environment. The majority (60%) of the participants do not
enjoy the political aspect of the SBO role, but accept that politics are a part of the job. One
participant stated that “achieving success necessitates engaging in board politics.” While the
participants disagree about whether the politics are tougher in urban districts or in small districts,
all agree that school districts are intensely political environments. Another participant who is a
CPA explained:
“It’s in my nature to see something wrong and fix
it. Sometimes you have to live with (a situation), not
fix it and work around it; and that has been my hardest
lesson. Pick your battles.”
More than half (60%) of the participants described the financial part of the job as some
variation of the phrase “not rocket science.” That is not to say that the participants believe that
the financial work is easy. Rather, because many fiscal processes are cyclical, almost all agree
that it takes a full year to see the most important processes just once. The second year is spent
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correcting mistakes made in the first year. It may take several more years to ensure that all of the
systems, procedures, staff and expertise is in place to ensure that operations run smoothly.
Citing the increased attention on financial accountability and a fiscal climate
characterized by shrinking resources, almost all (90%) of the participants agree that a working
knowledge of accounting is helpful, if not essential, for aspiring school business officials. Yet,
these participants believe that an aspiring school business official need not be trained as a CPA.
A CPA license does not ensure a successful career as a school business official because the scope
of the school business official’s responsibilities are typically much broader than accounting and
finance. Nor does a CPA license prepare a person to function in a political environment.
Almost all (80%) of the participants expressed that their formal education was deficient
in some respect, and that hard experience on the job was their real preparation. These
participants believe that the ideal training program would prepare a candidate to be successful in
the financial and political domains of the role. In spite of the growing importance of accounting
in school business, more than half (60%) of the participants indicated that they knew of
contemporary examples of successful school business officials who had little or no formal
training in accounting. Half of the participants were sharply critical of their graduate courses in
education, suggesting that typical graduate programs in education may not align with the work
requirements demanded in the school business role.
Feeling the shock on being immersed in the SBO role that some (40%) of the participants
described, a few (30%) of the participants indicated that in hindsight, they were not ready to take
their first SBO position. These participants indicated that learning quickly on the job was key to
their early survival. In the longer term, survival depends on “demonstrating knowledge and being
proactive.” All agree that “experience matters” and question whether an inexperienced person,
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regardless of preparation, could be effective. Even the youngest of the group, for whom school
business was a career choice, sees wisdom in later entry into the profession.
“You know I’d go home for the first couple
months and say geez, what am I doing here? Because
it was tough. I mean there was a lot of different
things. A lot of complicated topics that, you know,
doing school work and internships don’t prepare you
for … I probably wouldn’t recommend a really young
person to go into it (school business). I think coming
from a different profession…that’s the way most
people, I think, enter this profession … probably later
in life.”
Relationship with the superintendent. The participants universally acknowledged that
the school business official role is a demanding one, pressure packed, and typically requiring 50
to 60 hours a week; more during peak times of the school cycle. As heavy as the school business
official’s workload is, the superintendent’s burden is heavier. A clear majority (80%) of the
participants expressed a great deal of respect for the people who can manage the all-consuming
nature of the superintendent position.
“…they (superintendents) are really more
accountable than you are in the realm of things
because the buck stops there. You know with the
board, with the community, with everything. It’s all on
their shoulders.”
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While school business officials exercise considerable decision-making authority, in a
formal sense that authority is delegated from the superintendent. A majority of the participants
clearly recognize that the superintendent is “the boss.” One participant expressed this
relationship in the statement: “I am a decision-maker, but I am not the ultimate decision-maker.”
All of the participants are sensitive to signals from the superintendent and a majority were
explicit that they strive to meet the superintendent’s expectations. One participant stated plainly
that s/he is 1) personally accountable to the superintendent, and 2) meeting (that person’s)
expectations is “the most important thing” for survival. Another participant explained:
“If you are going awry, you’ll know pretty quickly
because people will either ‘throw you under the bus’ or
they will go above you. My superintendent is very
good, and his administrators create solutions, not
problems. So if … you are constantly troubleshooting
issues with (people)… you know you have a problem.”
The superintendent’s firm hand is especially important in early career. Some (40%)
participants spoke about feeling shock and fear when immersed in their first position as a school
business official. The participants estimated that it takes a minimum of six months, but most
often a year or two, before attaining a reasonable degree of comfort in the role. A participant
characterized “Year 2” as a year of refinement; learning what you needed to know, figuring out
your mistakes and what you should have done in Year 1. School business officials are
particularly vulnerable during this period of early development. As one participant explained:
“…you’ve got to know where your boundaries are
and when you need to kick (an issue) up to the next
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level (the superintendent). … It’s when you don’t
know and can’t figure it out (but still try to) navigate
those boundaries is when you get in trouble.”
Looking back, a few (30%) participants expressed a feeling either of gratitude to those
superintendents who had guided them while in their first SBO positions, or a belief that they
were lucky to have superintendents who saw the participant’s potential and “took a chance” by
hiring them.
“I was very excited to be out on my own, but was
I ready? I don’t think so. … Until you get that first
position and can get that experience, you’re never
ready. And that’s why it’s critical to have a
superintendent who sees the potential but is willing to
actually work with you to, kind of, get your wings
and fly. There were lots of times where _______
would come in after the board meeting and say, here’s
what I liked, here’s what was good, here’s where you
need to improve in the future, here’s where you have
to take a different path in the future…. And he did
that with anything I did.”
The participants in mid or late career have reached a point where they “enjoy” their
relationship with their superintendent even when the coaching behavior is likely to continue.
“In executive (session) we play off each other,
but I understand what my role is. And, um, we
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always do feedback after the Board meeting, like, you
know, how did I do? Did I go too far? And it's a
constant building that base of trust with your boss.”
Experienced school business officials have the benefit of knowing the issues, having
access to relevant information and knowing what is expected of them. Experienced school
business officials are comfortable and confident in their roles, so the relationship with their
superintendent can become mutually supporting.
“You have to be able to support your
superintendent in the manner that … you're covering
their tail on things. Not that they're trying to do it
wrong, but you see things in a different perspective.
But you have to understand how they make decisions.
That's critical to be a resource to your superintendent.”
However, a participant who worked in a district where three superintendents had come
and gone suggested that the freedom given to a school business official is a matter of the
superintendent’s leadership style.
“I’ve had three superintendents since I’ve been
here, all very, very different kinds of people. ... The
first person, a wonderful superintendent, but I was not
allowed to speak at a board meeting unless he
directed me to speak. The next two wanted my input.
They wanted me to feel free to speak up as needed.
And you don’t take offense to that, that’s their style.”
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Job autonomy. The job autonomy construct in the literature reflects the extent to which a
person is allowed freedom to schedule work, independently make decisions, and select the
methods used to perform tasks. Autonomy can be derived from formal codes or organizational
position. While autonomy is commonly thought of as exogenous – something that can be given
or taken away – for this project autonomy is better conceptualized as a perception. To these
participants, feeling autonomous is critical for their effectiveness.
“I'm not constrained, but I have constraints. … No
one's telling me how to manage my day, they trust you,
and that's … what I like to work under. I like room, I
like rules, and I like to have that one-on-one with the
CEO. I've done well in my career (when I have) that.
I don't do so well when I don't have that.”
When a person senses that they are autonomous, they may feel free to express creativity.
Participants expressed their belief that others expect school business officials to think creatively
and solve problems. Half of the participants cautioned that school business officials can be
creative, but within limits, and typically creativity is only appreciated within the sphere of
resource utilization. One participant commented on the limited opportunity to be creative:
“It used to be that if you had some creativity and
had the support of your community, you could do great
things. (But) creativity is now discouraged. The work is
regimented and strict.”
Viewing the range of problems that school business officials commonly deal with on a
governance – operational continuum, one might expect that school business officials with
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assistant superintendent job titles would be more directly engaged with governance processes
than those with school business manager or school business administrator job titles. A clear
majority (80%) of the participants regardless of title indicated that they are engaged with the
school board directly and to a considerable degree independently of the superintendent. Asked
whether it was the superintendent or the school business official that led the budget discussion
with the board, a participant answered flatly “I do.” Another indicated that independent
decision-making is something a school business official learns early in their careers.
“You know, you learn how to interact with the
board president and vice president. And you learn,
<that> you’re actually involved in the politics … So I
had to learn how much information to share with the
Board of Education. Not to withhold information, but
to (facilitate) their ability to process it.”
Establishing role boundaries that allow a school business official to feel autonomous can
be negotiated in some situations. This is critical for the school business official who seeks out
interim assignments or “side jobs.”
“I'm fortunate enough being an interim to kind
of meet with Boards in the beginning and talk to
them about who's going to run the business office;
is it going to be me or is it going to be them? And I
give them a couple of examples, and we usually
take it from there.”
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All of the participants acknowledge that much of their work is driven by deadlines, but
much of it is not. School business officials also have considerable latitude to determine the
methods for accomplishing their work.
“I come to work every Monday never knowing
what the week is going to hold for me, what the new
crisis is going to be, what’s got to be figured out and
solved by Tuesday, or what new thing that I haven’t
even thought of is going to land on my desk that
needs to be figured out and solved. “
Felt obligations. All of the participants expressed having internalized professional
obligations driving them to serve the district and the community. All of the participants
described a felt obligation to live up to the management values of efficiency and effectiveness,
but also to personally-held majority values of frugality and honesty. The participants universally
verbalized an attitude that acting in a manner consistent with those values is something the
public is owed.
“We have a responsibility to save and be as
conservative and efficient as possible, period. This
isn’t my money, this is the taxpayer’s money and … I
take that very seriously.”
All of the participants spoke about their felt obligation to conduct financial business in a
transparent manner. The participants universally verbalized their belief that transparency is
something the public is owed. But a majority (70%) of the participants also spoke about
transparency as an important management strategy for building trust.
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“There is often a perception that there is fraud,
waste and abuse in local governments and I wanted to
help do my part to combat that and say, “Look, we
understand these are taxpayer dollars, we understand
that this is a business. They (school districts) have
financial reporting obligations, they have the need for
internal controls and strong management like any other
business. So (I’m) really just trying to help build an
understanding within the community that professionals
(are) working hard for the benefit of the community and
…, I find it very fulfilling to build that trust with the
community and with your various boards that you are
working with.”
Making a living as a school business official. Anecdotal evidence from school district
superintendents indicates that the school business official position is among the most difficult
positions to fill. This condition shapes the field of opportunities available to those seeking school
business positions.
Holding a position. Securing tangible benefits that contribute to their family’s welfare was
mentioned more often and more forcefully than less tangible benefits as something of value. Stable
income from long term employment, family health insurance and a retirement pension were prized
by a majority of the participants. These participants acted on a general belief that that school
districts are “good places to work” because they provide the tangible benefits needed to support a
family.
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“My wife and I found out we were expecting and
my father-in-law told me that there was an opening … at
the ___________ School District and that I should go
and take the exam and see if I could get into the school
district because they had excellent benefits and it was a
pretty good place to work.”
A participant with relatively few years of service as a school business official is also depending
on the stable employment that the occupation provides.
“I need a vocation here that provides me a living
to support my family and to do other things that I want
to do. And I think this opportunity has empowered me to
… support my family. I need a health care program to
provide for myself and for my family, and this vocation
has allowed me to do that. I’m blessed with an
opportunity to receive a retirement package down the
road with this vocation and that’s going to allow me to
pursue other interests and economically support myself.”
Semi-independent contracting. While continuous tenure in one district was the most
common strategy employed by the participants to secure stable, long-term employment,
opportunities exist to accelerate meeting personal financial goals. One approach is to take interim
assignments. A participant explains why interim assignments present such attractive
opportunities:
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“This is my sixth district working as an interim. I
worked in ten school districts altogether in 15 years. So
it's a one-and-a-half year average at each school district.
There have been a couple of different reasons why
school districts would hire … an interim. Usually …
the position's been vacated and it's either vacated
because the person resigned or the person was
terminated. Um, I've never had a situation where I was
called in and worked with the existing business official
who needed help, but they were staying at a job…”
Other SBOs take work with other school districts as “side jobs.” One of the participants indicated
that his school district hired a school business official from a neighboring school district to
function as the internal auditor. Another school business official is working as a consultant for
the _____________ School District, helping that district work through a fiscal crisis. The
advantage of taking interim positions or side work is that:
“…you negotiate with every single school
district. So you are being paid more for your talents
than <if you were> waiting to be moved up a Civil
Service list.”
Liking the work. The participants not only value pecuniary rewards, but they also take
enjoyment from the work itself. All ten participants identified the variety of problems and
projects that school business officials engage in as something they enjoy about the role. While
the participants asserted that everything that they do has financial implications, as a group they
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estimated that they spend between 20 and 75 percent of their time on concentrated financial
work. One participant suggested that district size or wealth might be an explanatory factor:
“I probably spend more time with finance than
some others … because most of the others can delegate.
(The job) really is 80% management and 20% number
crunching. With (my) position it’s probably more
number crunching, more detail… because (the district is)
smaller.”
Their management effort is applied to operational problems in the functional areas that
typically report to school business officials such as transportation, food service and buildings &
grounds. Human resources, particularly labor relations work such as collective bargaining and
enforcing labor contracts, was reported to be another area demanding a significant amount of the
participant’s time.
All of the participants derive a deeper sense of satisfaction from the results of their labor.
A few (30%) participants spoke about deriving satisfaction from a job well done with comments
focusing on skill exhibited in doing the job. One participant commented:
“…you need to be able to deal with all kind of
different people, from board members all the way
down to -- to the food service worker. And I like …
being able to relate at whatever level I need to.”
Others focused on tangible work products:
“That's the -- that's the excitement of the job
is, um, you know, seeing what you do, how it can
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go into action. You don't get that in a lot of
industries. You can just look out your window,
walk to the school and see, hey, there's the new
sidewalk, there's the new flooring, there's the new
HVAC. That's really, really enjoyable.”
However, a majority (70%) of the SBOs interviewed expressed a sense of satisfaction from
contributing to the welfare of the students and the broader public good.
“…at the end of the day it’s, there’s a kid
that’s going to graduate, there’s … a child with
special needs that’s going to get a piece of
equipment that’s going to help them be better
prepared so they’re in a position to learn. So it’s just
fun … that’s the aspect of the job that’s exciting.”
While several of the SBOs stated that they derive satisfaction from contributing to the
welfare of the students and to some extent to the broader public good, only one explicitly talked
about continuing to fulfill the SBO role in her current district due to feelings of obligation.
“Higher up for me could be in a larger district.
In a larger district where you have somebody else who
handles HR matters where you could really concentrate
just on the finance piece of it. So, yeh, higher up would
be more money. Uhm, …, but I am not in it for the
money so I would be evaluating other factors, ... I know
that’s a non-typical answer too…
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Theme Two: Assessing the Reform
Audits and Accountability. All of the participants accept without question that audits
serve a useful role in a larger system of accountabilities that protects the interests of taxpayers,
students, and the community at large. The participants are also not naïve about human nature
and the seductive power of unsecured money. As one participant wryly noted, “not watching
<your money> is a perfect invitation for someone to take some of it.” Expressing their belief
that a strong audit program will discourage dishonest activities, some participants expressed
bewilderment that the State had not routinely audited school districts for decades.
‘I think <when> you create an environment where
no one thinks there’s any rules, you are going to have
people taking advantage of the fact that nobody is
paying attention.”
Reform stimulus and structure. All of the participants attribute their being subjected to a
program of intensified auditing since 2005 as a direct result of the sensational financial scandal
that was uncovered in the Roslyn Unified School District on Long Island. One participant said
simply, “SBOs got a black eye.” While the Roslyn affair may have been the stimulus for
financial accountability reform, the participants are also aware that the Office of the State
Comptroller had found serious and persistent financial control issues in other school districts as
well. The William Floyd UFSD and the Roosevelt UFSD, both on Long Island, being two
prominent examples.
All of the participants also recognized that the reform legislation contained several
unique monitoring strategies. The participants’ expressed varying opinions about how each
element of the reform should work to improve fiscal controls as well as how they see the reform
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actually working as implemented. All of the participants made generalized statements that each
of the reform elements worked to improve the overall control environment. This indicates that
the participants appreciated how the reform elements collectively worked together to close
monitoring gaps. However, the participants also viewed the reform elements in isolation, judging
each on their effectiveness in correcting vulnerabilities that they were intended to correct. These
are presented in the following table.

Table 7: Participant Endorsements of Selected Reform Elements
Participant

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

In Principle

1

0

-

1

1

-

1

1

1

1

In Practice

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

In Principle

1

0

-

0

1

-

1

1

0

0

In Practice

0

0

-

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

Audit
Committee

In Principle

1

-

1

-

1

1

-

1

1

1

In Practice

1

-

1

-

1

1

1

1

1

1

Performance
Audit

In Principle

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

In Practice

0

0

0

0

0

-

0

0

0

0

In Principle

-

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

In Practice

-

0

1

0

1

1

-

1

1

1

In Principle

1

1

1

-

1

1

1

1

1

1

In Practice

0

0

0

0

0

-

-

1

1

0

Positive
Neutral
Negative

1
0

External Auditor
Tendering

Internal Audit

Claims Audit

Financial
Training
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External audit tendering, internal and claims auditing. All of the participants value a
competent, capable external auditor. As one participant said, “a meaningful audit is well worth
the price.” Shrewd school business officials also use their external auditor as a sounding board,
obtaining advice about internal issues or emerging external standards through the entire year.
The element of the reform legislation requiring auditor tendering was designed to prevent
relationships between the auditor and school district from becoming too comfortable and
interests too closely aligned. While the reform legislation requires school districts to
competitively solicit for an external auditor every five years (tendering), it does not require the
district to select a different auditor (rotation). While more than half of the participants indicated
that the reform is a good idea in principle, all of the participants were ambivalent as to whether
the reform had any impact in practice. All of the participants were aware that auditor turnover
was uncommon and question whether this reform could have the desired effect without a
requirement for a school district to actually change auditors after a specified term. More than half
of the participants were explicit that the requirement to issue a request for proposals (RFP) for an
external auditor has had no effect on their choice of external auditors. While the most common
reason for keeping their external auditor after a solicitation was satisfaction with the current
auditor, one participant indicated that there were few, if any, viable alternatives in the regional
auditing market.
Nonetheless, a few of the participants expressed a belief that the reform had a practical
benefit insofar as the RFP process has provided a competitive force to improve audit quality
and/or to keep audit fees at reasonable levels.
“I was not happy with our auditors because from
a professional standards perspective, they were going
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through the motions of an audit, they weren’t really
auditing anything. The audit report was barely worth
the paper it was printed on. …. So we did the RFP, we
ended up actually paying more for the audit, but we got
an audit that was meaningful and fulfilled what you
would expect an audit to do.”
According to the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants (2014), a
mandated internal audit is an essential audit function in any sized school district. However, this
element of the reform is clearly the most controversial for the participants. Participants were
evenly divided, with less than half in support of the reform, less than half against the reform and
two taking neutral positions. However, a clear majority of the participants expressed highly
negative reactions toward the internal audit mandate in practice. These participants characterized
the reform as “a waste of money.” From their own experience and from anecdotal evidence from
colleagues, the seven unsupportive participants believe that the internal audit mandate was costly
and had produced “minimal benefit” and that continuing the practice would be “excessive.”
These participants endorse expanding an exemption enacted in 2013 that relieves the internal
audit mandate for districts under 1,500 students.
However, two of the participants expressed strong support for mandated internal audits.
Another expressed contingent support, stating that “there was a role for an internal auditor in
some circumstances,” typically in circumstances where the district was in fiscal crisis.
A claims auditor reviews the detail associated with vouchers and invoices for correctness,
confirms that the expenditure is for a valid district purpose, and approves the transactions for
payment. While the legislation does not mandate that a claims auditor position be created, if the
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board opts not to create a claims auditor position, it must perform the claims review itself. This
creates a strong incentive for school boards to create a claims auditor position in their school
district.
More than half of the participants expressed that, in principle, the claims auditor mandate
is a positive reform. In practice, these participants are equally positive. They value the “second
pair of eyes” and believe that this is a needed position. One participant exclaimed, “If the
mandate went away tomorrow, I wouldn’t get rid of the claims auditor!”
Two participants, both CPAs, conceded that the position “lightened the load” for the
board, but asserted that claims auditing did not add value to the control environment. The
participants that had negative attitudes about the claims auditor position expressed concern that
the claims auditor might overstep their authority and create obstacles and/or problems for a
school business official.
“I've also seen the Board … try to control
expenditures. If you really look at what a claims auditor is
supposed to do, they're not supposed to tell me, the
superintendent, the principal, or the science teacher that you
can't buy ten brand new microscopes. If it's in the budget,
it's in the budget. …. You can tell me or we can work
together on how I need to justify whatever I'm going to buy,
but you can't tell me I'm not going to buy it.”
Audit committees. The reform legislation requires that school districts constitute an audit
committee. A school district’s audit committee is advisory to its school board on matters relating
to both internal and external audits. None of the participants were critical of the audit committee
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concept, and a clear majority of the participants supported the audit committee requirement in
principle. The participants had worked with audit committees comprised of a mix of board
members and community members, and entirely of community members. But most often, the
districts in which they have experience choose to configure their audit committees from preexisting standing committees of their boards that dealt with broader business activities related to
budget and finance. The participant’s attitude about the audit committee in practice was also
quite positive. A few of the participants expressed that the reform had the “effect of structuring
and focusing the responsibilities of the audit committee, and that the committee was doing “good
things.” One participant explained that once the audit committee became sufficiently educated
about funding issues, members would become advocates for the district. Despite the generally
positive attitudes about audit committees and their benefits, one participant repeated the concern
about board members using the audit committee as a platform for controlling the district’s
expenditures.
Performance auditing. In the context of this project, a performance audit is an audit
conducted by the Office of the New York State Comptroller under the auspices of the 2005
Fiscal Accountability legislation. These audits are specifically identified as performance audits.
A review of audit reports between 2006 and 2011 indicates that audit scope was clustered around
a relatively small number of general themes: internal controls, both general and specific to a
particular administrative function, budget reviews, financial condition, information technology,
cost or revenue studies, and all other. These are respectively identified as ALL IC, BUDGT,
FINCO, INFOT, CORST and OTHR in the chart that follows. Even allowing for some
classification error, the most frequent audit scope for performance audits during the first six
years of the program was clearly the assessment of internal controls. A clear majority (80%) of
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the participants confirmed that the primary focus of the performance audit program in the first
five to six years seemed to be internal controls.
Figure 4: Primary Audit Focus (2006-2011)

Primary Audit Focus: 2006-11
OTHR, 15.2%
All IC
CORST, 5.7%

BUDGT

INFOT, 3.2%

FINCO

FINCO, 6.5%

INFOT
CORST

All IC, 62.5%
BUDGT, 6.9%

OTHR

Over time, the number of audits focusing on budget monitoring and financial condition
remained fairly constant. However, a new audit priority became apparent in 2010 and 2011 when
audits specifically focused on costs and revenue were conducted. The effort to complete cost and
revenue audits more than doubled the number of audits conducted on matters related to fiscal
performance.
Table 8: Audit Focus (Number of Audits by Type)

General
IC
FunctionSpecific
IC
All IC

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

ALL

20

86

119

103

8

12

348

40
60

99
185

72
191

59
162

15
23

60
72

345
693

94

BUDGT
FINCO
INFOT
CORST
OTHR
Total

8
2
1
1
33
105

12
9
12

16
10
3

16
21
9

31
249

19
239

18
226

15
10
0
29
45
122

10
20
10
33
22
167

77
72
35
63
168
1,108

Board involvement. One strand of the reform was to require board members to undergo
six hours of financial training endorsed by the Office of the State Comptroller. Almost all of the
participants believe that, in principle, financial training for board members would be beneficial.
However, all agree that six hours of financial training is insufficient preparation, and so only a
first step in acquiring all of the specialized knowledge that a board member should have.
“I don’t know if the training goes far enough to
really educate board members on the massive
responsibility they have as a board of education. You
know, I definitely think there could be more training.
… all these financial documents that they are required
to be familiar with… sometimes they need help …
(but) I think it definitely has stepped up the
accountability in terms of the board’s awareness of
their role to be financial stewards for the district.”
While awareness may have increased, more than half of the participants do not believe
that the training that their boards have received has helped elevate the dialogue about district
finances with their own boards very much, if at all. A few of the participants interviewed
indicated that the limited knowledge afforded by the training produced questions that were
sometimes unsophisticated and “a pain” to deal with. One of those participants indicated that
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relations between board and administration were strained because of the limited financial
training the board members received:
“It's good whenever a Board member is given
training that they can understand. The problem you
get is most people don't understand finances and they
understand school district finances even less. So …
under the shadow of Roslyn, (it seemed like board
members were) … required and encouraged to
question this, this, this, and this in a public meeting. It
almost became an “us versus them” kind of thing,
automatically … questioning the business official,
(presuming) we were doing something wrong and they
had to find it.”
However, a few participants believe strongly that the financial training has helped, if only
modestly, to elevate the board’s dialogue about district finances.
“I think (financial training) is very important.
Absolutely. … it makes them understand that they
really have to watch what goes on with finances.
Sometimes they get so into programs that they don’t
think about finances. And then you have the other
people that are there just to keep the taxes down. And
it is easier for me to talk to them about these things
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when they’ve gone through the training and they at
least know what the language is.”
Transparency. A majority (70%) of the participants generally feel that school districts
are as transparent as they need to be. Almost half of the participants made reference to the fact
that community residents already influence school district governance more directly than they do
any other unit of government because of their regular presence in the schools, opportunities to
speak at board meetings and particularly, the participants emphasized, because they “get to look
at and dissect the budget. What other sector of government has that level of scrutiny and
accountability?”
“Nobody votes on the state budget. Every four
years they get to vote on the governor, that’s about all
they get to do.”
Ubiquitous information technology is another reason the participants believe that
extraordinary efforts make school district finances more transparent is not necessarily needed.
Coupled with existing freedom of information laws, almost half of the participants expressed a
belief that an interested party can access virtually any school district data relatively easily. As
one participant explained:
“Because everything (information) is immediate
and everything (data) is accessible… people expect to
go to a district (web page) and be able to drill down to
everything that they want to know about a district.
They don’t all do that, but I think the expectation is that
information is at your fingertips...”
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Almost half (40%) of the participants expressed an appreciation that transparency has
costs, and that there may be a limit to how much transparency should be reasonably expected
before operational effectiveness suffers.
“I think we have more than every other (unit of
government) as far as transparency and openness.
They’re voting on the budget. Everything (data) is out
there. I don’t see a whole lot more that we could be
doing and still getting the job done and being able to do
it right. I really don’t.”
One participant expressed the opinion that it is the responsibility of the “officials in each district
to respond to their community’s informational needs. If your community is satisfied, you’ve
done enough.”
Theme Three: Surviving the Reform
Feeling valued. Almost all of the participants spoke about a felt sense of uncertainty that
comes from the risk of knowing that they are held responsible for an audit finding, yet not being
able to personally oversee every transaction:
“You always worry … that there’s something
going on that you don’t know and that’s why I like a
claims auditor. I like an external auditor. I like all
those other eyes because you’re pushed in so many
different directions you can’t always drill down and
keep an eye on every little thing that’s going on. So
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yeah, that’s the major concern. Is there is something
going on that I don’t know about?”
All of the participants indicated that their workload is heavy and getting heavier. Almost
all feel the pressure of the additional work and notice that the extra hours devoted to night
meetings, working at home and extra time in the office are inevitably leaving less personal time.
A majority (70%) of the participants described feeling under attack by the state’s political
leadership and appointed high-ranking staff. A few of these participants used colorful language
like “ridiculed and vilified” to describe what they believe is a systematic, calculated campaign by
the political leadership, particularly the Governor’s Office, to undermine the public’s confidence
in the fiscal management of public school districts.
“He's just trying to make us kill each other in
the industry, um -- you know. Make adversary
relationships with the community, with our Boards,
and with our teachers. And that's not going to solve
the problem.”
One participant called it a “political win for the Governor.” Using more measured language, the
others described a continuing sense of distrust between the political leadership and school district
administrations.
Not surprisingly, a majority (70%) of the participants also sensed that school business
officials are not valued by the Office of the State Comptroller (OSC). Half of the participants
expressed a belief that the Comptroller was “out to get people,” particularly in the earlier years
of the auditing program. One participant witnessed a speech by the Comptroller who was in
office at the time:
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“I was at one meeting where he spoke to the
___________ School District board and indicated what
had occurred in Roslyn relative to the flight, that
supersonic flight over to Europe for the superintendent and
billed out of his Home Depot account that the school
district paid for. He conveyed with such passion that it
was occurring in every district….”
According to one participant, the tone from the top has been transmitted to Office of the State
Comptroller staff such that in all of their dealings with school district fiscal managers are based
on a “presumption of incompetence.”
A majority (70%) of the participants believe that neither educators nor the general public
understand that scope of what school business officials are responsible do and what their role is.
The term “thankless job” was used by almost half of the participants to describe the SBO role.
One participant, a former teacher, revealed that educators view school business officials as
“obstacles to teacher morale” because of the school business official’s role as a rule-enforcer.
The participant elaborated that it was understandable why teachers and other educators would
feel that way.
“If you want to know how I’m performing as a
purchasing agent, go and ask a teacher what it’s like
to try to purchase something …, and they’ll tell you
it’s a miserable experience, that there are huge
barriers and why can’t I just buy what I want? If they
tell you that, then you know that I’m doing my job
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from a compliance standpoint, kind of backwards,
right?”
A few (30%) of the participants spoke about their belief that the public holds a generally
negative perception of them. The source of this negativity may be a part of the broadly held view
that public education is not currently fulfilling its mission. However, the school business official
is often the “deliverer of bad news,” often seeking community input for making “hard choices”
between program cuts, layoffs and tax increases; all unappealing choices for communities. One
participant spoke about being in the middle of divisive issues, in one case a tax exemption for
veterans:
“…unfortunately here’s a case where … one
(group of taxpayers) is going to pay at the expense of
another. I had a voter, a veteran, come up and say, “all
of you people here, when you were here at your
children’s game, (I was fighting overseas). I didn’t see
my child for the first year that my child was born.”
They’re saying some pretty significant things. It can
elicit a lot of emotion …. <Animated> so there’s a lot
of emotion that goes into this, you’ve got to be able to
… handle it, hopefully. That’s just one example.”
Even when a participant believed that s/he was seen favorably in the community, s/he was
resigned that “some will not be satisfied no matter what.”

101
“The public perception of administrators is
often not high. We joke around … that we’ll have
t-shirts that say, ‘Administrators Are Scum’.”
The feeling of being under attack from all quarters has taken an emotional toll on a
majority (70%) of the participants. These participants reported feelings of anger and
discouragement. One participant stated “I hate seeing the educational program suffer, but there
isn’t much I can do about it.” Almost all (90%) of the participants expressed a belief that the
political climate is not going to change anytime soon. As one participant put it, “There is no
cavalry coming.”
While only one of the participants indicated that s/he planned to exit the profession in the
relatively near future, others believe that the climate is an incentive for school business officials
to exit sooner than they might have otherwise:
“But I think it has gotten to a point where
people are retiring in droves just because they find it
so overwhelming that there is just no relief from the
statutory requirements, so I’m not there yet but give
me time.”
Almost all (90%) of the participants engage with and draw support from other school
business officials. Often local associations of school business officials are venues to discuss
technical/administrative or legal/political problems that they share as well as potential solutions
to those problems. One participant referred to this mutual support as “empowering,” reflecting
the isolating nature of the specialized problems and language of school business. Another
explained that only lawsuits and “going public” could tip the balance of power between the state
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and local school districts. A few (30%) of the participants participate in organized political
action through state-wide professional associations or political action groups engaged on the
broad issue of education finance in New York State.
Surviving the audit assault. The more than half (60%) of participants expressed in
colorful terms that the current frequency of audit is “excessive” insofar that it is beyond what is
reasonable for a school district to be subjected to or necessary to ensure a reasonable level of
accountability. The participants sharing this attitude say that the auditing “is non-stop,” and
school districts “get hit from every direction.” The frequency of auditing is “approaching
ridiculousness” and there is “less of a need to continue.” The State has gotten “carried away.”
Two of the participants expressed the minority opinion. Their belief is that a need for
accountability remains, and even if there was no need, audits are “good discipline.”
Half of the participants believe that the State imposes a new rule or audit scheme as a
reaction to political pressure. Some (30%) participants believe that the current program is
focused on the “wrong things.” The audit focus may be a high priority for the Office of the State
Comptroller but of “low significance” for the school business official. Regardless, the audits put
the school business official on the defensive such that these participants feel that “you have to
explain everything you do.”
The majority (70%) of participants expressed a belief that the accountability environment
is more intense now than in the past. As one participant said, “there are so many more people
looking for what you did wrong.” With so many auditors looking, error is going to be found.
None of the participants believe that any school business official could survive a finding
involving criminal behavior or suggesting gross negligence. But findings of this sort are not
common. Corruption on the scale uncovered during the audit of the Roslyn school district is
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exceedingly rare because they require the collusion of several key district officials as well as the
external auditor. The participants agree that Roslyn was an aberration involving an
unprecedented conspiracy.
Much more commonly, a well-designed audit conducted by an expert, objective auditor is
likely to produce findings that offer valuable advice that the school business official can use to
improve efficiency of the school district’s financial operations or to reduce the risk of theft or
error. While these sorts of findings in an audit report can be valuable, almost all of the
participants expressed frustration that audits can be a time-consuming distraction from important
day-to-day operations. Some (40%) of the participants expressed that the audits conducted by the
Office of the State Comptroller have been beneficial in some instances. However, a clear
majority (80%) of the participants believe that the audits conducted by the Office of the State
Comptroller very often produce findings that are “technically correct” but of “little significance.”
The participants do not find these audit reports particularly helpful, and for the school business
officials this is not a trivial point. Almost all (90%) of the participants feel that audits should
produce benefits commensurate to the effort required.
No audit finding, no matter how inconsequential it may seem, is without risk. Almost all
of the participants believe that a school business official can survive almost any non-criminal
finding as long as it can be explained and the school business official has a plan to address the
finding.
“I think as long as you can explain to your
board and to your community that you recognize the
problem and you are addressing the problem, you can
get through it”
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Still, a few (30%) of the participants believe that audits are seen as “summative
indications of how you are managing.” The participants are aware that audit reports are widely
available for the public to read. If an audit finding is not explained well and put in its proper
context, it can become political ammunition. Verbs used in the report can create a range of
responses in the community. More than half (60%) of the participants expressed a belief that
media attention will produce negative consequences. How the district responds to the audit
finding can help to diffuse the criticism or exacerbate the problem:
“I don’t find it beneficial to respond
defensively to an audit like that cause you really can’t
win at the end of the day… you can state the facts
and you can thank them (the auditors) for their
support, but … a couple of them … had really
defensive responses - almost arrogant - and that’s not
helpful. You know, your community reads (those
reports) …, so you have to be careful how you
approach (your response).”
Superintendents are hyper-sensitive to political criticism and may use an audit finding to
build a case against a school business official for dismissal with cause.
“I’ve also seen a particular district (where a
business) … official and superintendent didn’t get
along and that evidence of the bad audit was used to
really sever that business official’s relationship with
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the district and then the official sued and it just got
ugly…”
More than half (60%) of the participants acknowledged that audit findings can be
damaging and even career-ending events. How participants described how the media is used as a
weapon in the build-up to dismissal is strikingly similar. As one participant described it:
“There’d be a big write-up in the paper, the
media would run with it, the board would say you
brought a big embarrassment on the community,
you’re not doing your job and, the next thing you
know is that …they’re calling your position something
else. There’s a real fear that’s involved there.”
A clear majority (80%) of the participants believe that the audits conducted by the Office
of the State Comptroller were a means to attack school business officials in the earlier years of
the audit program (2005-2010). The participants believe that the tone of the publicly-available
audit reports was intentionally inflammatory even when the finding represented a minor risk and
had no financial consequence. The audit reports were soon followed by press releases suggesting
that error or wrong-doing had been uncovered.
“Well OSC found ‘this.’ They don’t give you
the context of the findings, they just say you did this
thing that you shouldn’t be doing. Alright, you know
you look at a <multi> million dollar operation and this
is like literally the flea on the back of the dog and it
becomes this media sensation. “(I say) put it in
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context for the average citizen who already believes
that (school business officials) must all be corrupt
bungling fools.”
Almost half (40%) of the participants elaborated that the scapegoating tactics effectively
exploited the school business official’s vulnerability to political pressure by using the audit
reports and the press releases to focus the widely-held negative perception about government to
bear on school districts and fiscal administrators.
Impact on the role. More than half (60%) of the participants believe that compliance
activities are expanding. One participant referred to the “litany” of new requirements. Some
(30%) of the participants were explicit that the job is becoming increasingly about compliance
with rules rather than meeting the district’s operational or financial goals.
“It’s (the reforms have) made it so there’s less
time for me managing the budget and coming up with
new ideas. You’re just trying to keep your head above
water all the time.”
More than half of the participants indicated that they feel the pressure of additional
accountability demands. For half of the participants, relief from the audit requirements would
make the job “a lot easier.” More than contributing to a difficult workday, the additional work
created by audit issues eats into private time. The participants spend more time in the office and
working from home than before the reform.
“It wasn’t always like this.” It used to be you
could come in. You made sure payroll was out. You
made sure that the audit reports were done. You
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know, submit a few cost reports for special ed(ucation)
and you were good. The expectations and the
responsibilities have just been piling on, piling on.”
Embedded in an audit finding is a recommendation from the auditor about how to resolve
or correct each particular finding. Once reported, an audit finding remains unresolved until the
school district reports some action or event to resolve it. While the school business official can
recommend to the superintendent and school board that an auditor recommendation not be
implemented, the majority (70%) of participants believe that such an approach is usually unwise.
“They have the bully pulpit so everybody
thinks, “Oh you should do what they are saying
because they are the state. They must … know what
they are talking about.” And it kind of makes it
difficult for governments to make the case of, “Well
this what they said, but here’s why this is difficult to
achieve, here is what we are doing to respond to that.
You know, it puts you in a case of having to defend
what you are doing and I don’t know, it’s not the
most constructive way to work together.”
Nonetheless, in cases where the finding is easily implemented, a majority (70%) of the
participants simply comply even if it is not efficient or otherwise beneficial to do so. One
participant described the strategy as “picking your battles.”
“Well I guess any business official is hesitant to start
a fight with the state controller’s office just because you
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know they’re going to come back now at least every five
years. … Did (their recommendation) really lend any
value to our process? I don’t know that it did. We said
okay, we’ll do it.… Doesn’t take a lot of time, just added
paperwork to the file. Not a big deal, we didn’t really fight
it …The option you have when they make a
recommendation is to get into a long, slow, tortuous…I
won’t say argument, but contentious dispute over whether
it’s needed or not. At the end of the day, you know, it’s like
pick your battles and move on.”
Nonetheless, in cases where an auditor recommendation would require a significant
resource commitment, more than half of the participants are less willing to comply without an
assessment of the cost/benefit in terms of risk reduction. If implementing the recommendation
significantly reduces the possibility of theft, “those kinds of things you need to implement and
take serious.” However, in cases where the implementation costs are high but the risk reduction
is low, the participants are divided on the appropriate response. Some (30%) of the participants
are willing to decline to implement the auditor’s recommendation:
“If they said something crazy like you need to
hire three more people to do something, we would
probably say we don’t have the resources to do that,
thank you for the suggestion.”
But others are more cautious:
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“I think you can push back to a certain extent.
You can challenge … on the basis of … compensating
controls … but you have to be on solid footing with
whatever your argument.”
Success. School business officials have several instrumental financial goals in common
with fiscal officers in other municipal governments such as achieving a balanced budget, having
no glaring deficiencies on audits and protecting the school district’s bond rating. One study
participant looks beyond the numbers to define success:
“It’s really not so much the financial indicators.
Yes, I look at that. I make sure we’re at our 4% fund
balance. I make sure our reserves are where they need
to be, but I feel successful when we’re on the right
track with education; when our graduation rates are
going up and when we’re doing better on state tests.
You know, those are the things we’re supposed to do.”
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Chapter 5 – Interpretations, Recommendations, and Conclusion
This chapter will provide a brief summary of the study, relate the findings to prior
research, offer recommendations and the researcher’s reflections, and suggest possible directions
for future research studies.
Summary of the Study
Prior research has pointed out that models intended to explain the organizational
commitment (OC) of public employees has not accounted for the substantial and often intense
external controls imposed on public organizations. Based on a review of the existing literature,
an initial theoretical framework was developed. The framework proposed that a public financial
manager’s organizational commitment was dependent on their perceptual constructions of the
job autonomy and supervisor support that they enjoyed. Further, it suggested that public financial
managers’ perceptions of autonomy and support might change as external controls manifested as
a reform imposed behavioral constraints in their work environment. The goal of this study was to
investigate whether the aforementioned relationships held true in a case where an administrative
reform that imposed a regime of overlapping audits was thought to significantly affect the work
environment of the financial managers who must comply with the mandated reforms, and
thereby better establish a linkage between administrative reforms to organizational commitment
in the public sector context.
Ten school business officials from New York State participated in the study. Participants
were interviewed using a semi-structured interview protocol consisting of 16 open-ended
questions. Questions were designed to allow the participant to provide relevant background data,
as well as reveal their attitudes, values and beliefs about audits and financial accountability in
general and elements of the 2005 financial accountability reform in particular. The interviews
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were recorded on a digital recording device and then transcribed by professional transcribers.
Consistent with grounded theory research, initial, axial and selective coding processes were
applied to the corpus resulting in a set of findings organized as themes. These findings led to a
revision of the original theoretical model.
The central research question to be explored was: “how do school business officials in
public school districts, as auditees, perceive the effects of a recent financial accountability/audit
reform program; and in what ways do their perceptions affect the psychological attachments that bind

the auditees to their organizations?” The following sub-questions serve to guide the exploration of
different aspects of the central research question.
5. How do these school business officials describe and explain the effects of the reform on
their work environment, activities and relations?
6. How do these school business officials describe and explain the effects of the reform on
their professional identities, motivations and commitments?

According to the ten participants interviewed for the study, the accountability demands produced
by the reform have affected their work environment in tangible ways.
Findings and Interpretations
Theme one: Becoming established. The first theme focused on the participants’ preservice preparation and entry into the school business field, how they understand the role, and
the limits of discretion that the participants believe constrain their actions. This theme relates to
two psychological constructs included in the proposed model: job autonomy and organizational
commitment.
The findings of this study do shed some light on the nature of the participant’s
commitments. Research on public service motivation suggests that a school business official
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would be a person having a higher propensity toward public service than most other people.
However, all of the participants in this study had studied business in college and all but one had
embarked on a career in private business after graduation. Even more telling is that six of the
nine participants who began careers in the private sector persisted in their private sector business
careers for a decade or longer before becoming school business officials. Therefore this finding
is not consistent with the extant public service motivation research.
While the participants clearly enjoy certain aspects of their work and take some
satisfaction in knowing that their efforts benefit schoolchildren, this research found that for most
of the participants, the affective and normative dimensions of organizational commitment were
far less important to the participants than the continuance dimension. Stable income from long
term employment, family health insurance and a retirement pension were prized by a majority of
the participants. This finding supports the continued relevance of side-bet theory and indicates
that continuing the line of inquiry on investments is warranted.
Job autonomy reflects the extent to which a person is allowed freedom to schedule work,
independently make decisions, and select the methods used to perform tasks. This study found
that all of the participants expressed having internalized professional obligations that governed
their work-related conduct. To these participants, feeling autonomous is critical for their
effectiveness. This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that job autonomy is
important for those in white collar occupations as well as recent research by Chang, Leach and
Anderman that a perceptual construct very similar to job autonomy is very important for
educational leaders.
Academic literature that discusses the careers of school business officials is rare. While
not a specific goal of this research project, the description of the study participants extends what
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is known about the careers of school business officials. A recent dissertation by Vandrew (2012)
studied the career plateau phenomenon using a sample of Pennsylvania school business officials.
Career plateauing occurs in mid-to-late career. This project offers a model of the school business
official’s career entry. Finally, this study finds that school business officials find it advantageous
to change positions, particularly in the early and late career stages. Shifting positions in early
career suggests that school business officials may engage in the same sorting behaviors that
classroom teachers have been shown to engage in (Lankford, Loeb & Wykoff, 2002).
Theme two: Assessing reform. The second theme focused on the participants’
perceptions of accountability, to whom they are accountable, and their perceptions of various
mechanisms for establishing accountability. This theme relates to the control mechanisms
embedded in the 2005 reform legislation and how the 2005 reform legislation has been
implemented.
Reform stimulus and structure. Findings from this study show that the participants
accept without question that auditing serves a useful role in a larger system of accountabilities
that ultimately protects the interests of taxpayers, students, and the community at large. Further,
the participants universally attribute the reform legislation to the unprecedented fraud that took
place in the Roslyn Union Free School District and generally agree with the principles of the
reform initiative. This is consistent with Zimmerman’s conclusion that government accounting
reforms do not gain traction unless one of three events occur: 1) incentives for voters and
officials change; 2) there is a legal mandate to adopt the reform, or 3) discovery of fraud or
mismanagement. Obviously, the discovery of fraud on an unprecedented scale in Roslyn
provided the catalyst for the New York State Legislature to approve such a comprehensive set of
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external controls. More importantly for purposes of this study, is that the Roslyn case provided
what school business officials accepted as a legitimate rationale to enacting the reform.
As a result of the overlapping audits required by the reform legislation, the participants
also indicated that they spend much more time and attention dealing with audits, inquiries and
other compliance issues. This finding supports the previous research conducted by Wilner (2008)
who found, based on interviews with a sample of school business officials working in Long
Island school districts, that the reform elements made fraud more difficult and strengthened
accountability.
External auditor rotation. The literature on external auditor rotation in the public sector
clearly shows that audit quality is negatively associated with auditor tenure. Therefore a policy
goal for a mandating auditor rotation is to shorten audit tenure. Similarly, a policy goal for
requiring audit tendering is to encourage the shortening of auditor tenure. With either policy,
shortening auditor tenure will presumably improve audit quality. One finding of this study is that
only a few of the participants had changed auditors since the reform legislation. Of the
participants that did change their external auditors, they appear not to have done so because of
the requirement to competitively solicit for proposals. Further, all of the participants question
whether auditor tenure could be shortened without a legal mandate requiring school districts to
actually change auditors after a specified term. While the findings neither support nor refute
conclusions in prior research about the relationship of audit quality and auditor tenure, the study
adds to the conversation by suggesting a necessary condition to shorten auditor tenure.
In the academic literature on auditing, the dominant view of audit quality is based on
DeAngelo’s (1981) definition: audit quality is the probability that an auditor will detect material
errors in the client’s financial records and then report them. In other words, the more error found
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during the audit process, the better the audit. Yet, the participants in the study use their external
auditor as a resource throughout the year, and so value a stable relationship with a competent,
capable external auditor who is familiar with the district leadership, finances and operations.
Such a relationship tends to develop over time as familiarity between the auditor and the client
grows. This is precisely the type of comfort that mandatory auditor rotation is designed to limit.
Internal audit. In the literature, internal auditing in municipal government is
controversial; perhaps because the characteristics of internal audit operations such as mission,
resources, and practice vary greatly across jurisdictions. This study finds that study participants
were evenly divided about the principle of mandated internal audit at the municipal level, with
less than half in support of mandated internal audit, less than half against mandated internal audit
and two taking neutral positions. To professional organizations like the New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants (2014), a mandated internal audit is an essential audit function
for any school district regardless of its size. This view is counter-balanced by the participants in
this study who expressed highly negative reactions toward the internal audit mandate as it was
implemented. Although it should be noted that the literature on internal audit specific to local
government is not extensive, this finding reflects the lack of agreement about the appropriateness
and utility of internal auditing for local governments found in the existing literature. More
specifically, this finding is consistent with Aikens’ (2012) study of government auditors where it
was found that audit clients frequently delayed or avoided adopting audit recommendations.
Audit committees. The literature on municipal audit committees is quite recent and
therefore not extensive. Because audit committees remain optional for a substantial proportion of
local governments, the research to date seeks to explain voluntary formation. However,
published studies exist that describe the characteristics of audit committees and document the
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perceptions of officials about their utility. While the reform of interest mandated audit
committees in New York, this study adds to the latter research stream in that none of the
participants were critical of the audit committee concept and a clear majority of the participants
supported the audit committee requirement in principle. The participants’ attitude about the audit
committee in practice was also quite positive. The findings of this project are consistent with the
research on audit committees conducted to date.
Performance auditing. Perhaps because the practice of performance auditing has varied
widely across jurisdictions and over time, performance audits seem to lack conceptual clarity in
the current academic literature. However performance audits are described by early proponents
as prescriptive, output-oriented analyses of operations conducted in a manner uniquely designed
for each audit. However, performance audits may also include reviews for compliance with laws
and policies, propriety and alignment with social, economic and political goals. Even with the
range for a possible audit scope being exceedingly broad, the most frequent scope for
performance audits during the first six years of the Office of the State Comptroller’s performance
audit program was a review of internal controls. While this finding is not consistent with the
literature, it should be noted that a substantial number of output-oriented analyses of operations
were conducted. Further, a small number of fiscally-stressed districts were subject to analyses of
financial condition and quarterly budget review. The participants indicate that in recent years the
scope of the performance audits has moved away from reviewing internal controls to topics that
are more fiscal and operational in nature. To the extent that this transition is occurring, this study
is consistent with both the early literature defining performance audits and later literature on the
application of performance audits in broader real-world contexts.
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Theme three: Surviving the reform. The third theme focused on the participants’
perceptions of the effects of the reform on their work environments and relations. This theme
relates to levers that could affect the psychological attachments of the participants on which
commitment ultimately depends.
Possible effect on organizational commitment. This project clearly indicates that the
participating school business officials firmly believe that the collective monitoring strategies
embedded in the financial accountability reform of 2005 have substantially impacted their work
environment, often in ways perceived by the participants as negative. This reinforces early
research by Buchanan, and Balfour and Wechsler who concluded that work experiences
influence commitment far more than individual characteristics.
The results of this project also find that the reform has affected how the participating
school business officials feel about persisting in the occupation. All of the participants
acknowledged that the additional auditing requires more of their time and attention. The finding
supports Christensen and Laegrid’s conclusion that managers are likely to have the strongest
feelings about reforms when the reforms affect how the managers practice their craft.
The challenging and difficult environment, which the participants believe is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future, is creating stress and a sense of discouragement for the
participating school business officials. This finding supports Stazyk, Pandey and Wright’s
preliminary conclusion that external control is transmitted to individuals and can ultimately
diminishing affective commitment. The finding is also consistent with Yang and Pandey’s
finding of a negative association between bureaucratic structure and normative commitment, and
Dunn and Legge’s finding that reforms produce higher transaction costs and employee stress.
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Possible reputational effects. Another finding of this study is that the participants were
very sensitive to the portrayal of audit findings in the media. The participants believe that very
negative consequences for school business officials can result when audit outcomes, even those
with little practical consequence, are portrayed in an unbalanced fashion for consumption in the
community. This finding supports and extends Desai, Hogan and Wilkins’ finding that executive
turnover follows a failure to comply with accounting standards (GAAP) in the private sector. In
the figure below, reputation is shown as effecting perceived supervisor support. The nature of the
connection to organizational commitment requires more exploration.
Figure 5: Revised Theoretical Construct
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Possible effects on perceived supervisor support. This study also found that the
participant’s relationship with the district superintendent is an important one throughout the
school business official’s career albeit for different reasons in early and later career stages. As
such, the superintendent would be a key person whose support would be needed in order to
continue serving as a school business official in any circumstance. This would be especially true
in situations when charges of incompetence or lack of integrity are alleged, the evidence does not
clearly demonstrate the connection between the audit variables and perceived supervisor support.
This is due to two factors. The first is that while many of the participants knew of or had heard
about an audit that resulted in a business official being dismissed, none of the participants
indicated that their own relationship with their superintendent was ever impacted by an audit.
The second factor is that no data was collected from superintendents, making it impossible to
determine how much weight, if any, that superintendents give to audit outcomes in their
evaluation of a school business official’s performance.
Along with job autonomy, the perceived supervisor support construct comprise the two
main antecedents of organizational commitment in Brimeyer, Perrucci and Wadsworth’s (2010),
cited previously. Therefore, the findings from this study does not confirm, elaborates on, or
refute the use of perceived supervisor support in the model.
This research project has examined the case of school business officials who were subject
to an audit-intensive reform program that had the potential to impact their work environment and
relations in substantial ways. The findings of the study are generally consistent with the initial
theoretical model developed from the extant literature and support further testing of the variables
and linkages that comprises the theoretical model. However, the further specification of the
linkage between audit variables and perceived supervisor support is an important revision to be
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included. In addition to improving future research of a theoretical model, the study did produce
findings that could inform current discussions about how to ensure that the considerable financial
resources devoted to public schooling are competently managed.
Recommendations
Anecdotal evidence from school district superintendents leads one to believe that in spite
of multiple paths into the role, the school business official position remains the most difficult
administrative position to fill. This could be because school business operations require highly
specialized knowledge unlikely to be acquired in other institutional roles or settings. Also, the
position is demanding. The participants in this study described the school business role as a
“financial position that functions in a political context.” Success depends as much on
understanding political situations as on doing financial tasks well.
The participants who completed graduate-level training in education were very critical of
the training they received. The participants indicated that the training they received neither
provided the specialized administrative knowledge most necessary for success, nor the practical
skills needed to survive in a political environment. While it may be impossible to provide all of
the knowledge and skills necessary for survival and ultimate success in the field, graduate
programs in education should be strengthened with case study, simulations, capstone experiences
and experiential learning in order to provide more of what school business officials value and
need.
The ability to understand political situations comes with experience and maturity. The
single best way for career-changers to obtain the specialized knowledge needed to function as a
school business official is long-term experiential learning under the tutelage of a seasoned school
business official and superintendent. While opportunities for these kinds of apprenticeships exist,
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they are rarely paid positions. Because the prospect of foregoing a substantial annual income is
usually prohibitive for a candidates with family obligations, legislators, and leaders of
foundations, professional associations and educational institutions should consider providing
training grants that can sustain a middle-income lifestyle for a year or longer to lessen the barrier
of entry of into the field.
In general, the academic research to date about various elements of the reform does not
provide sufficient evidence to guide policy. Policy debates, particularly over external auditor
rotation and internal audit in the public sector, will continue to be hotly contested. More research
should continue in these areas. However, in the absence of clear evidence that these mandates
produce economic savings or produce real gains for democratic governance, external audit
tendering and an internal audit function should be optional for public school districts and decided
locally.
While insufficient, there is at least some research available to guide policy related to
several elements of the reform. Unfortunately, there is no apparent academic body of research to
guide policy with respect to three of the reform elements. These elements are claims auditing,
board involvement and the corrective action plan. Nonetheless, it is possible to make
recommendations in these areas based on political norms or best practice as opposed to positive
science.
Claims auditing is a function unique to government that is distinct from corporate
accounts payable (A/P). Unlike corporate accounts payable, it is not the responsibility of the
claims auditing function to pay claims of any sort. Rather, the purpose of claims auditing is to
pre-audit claim documents for compliance with law, policy, auditability and propriety. Also
unlike corporate accounts payable, claims auditing is not a responsibility of management. The
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claim audit function is established in law as a responsibility of the governing board. There was
considerable opposition to the claims auditing mandate among the participants in the study, even
among those that were CPAs. This may reflect general dissatisfaction with the lag effect caused
by the arcane practice of reviewing and approving each and every claim14 that many districts
continue to use. Legislators should recognize the monetary cost of inefficiency and evaluate
whether claims auditing has a place in current theories of audit or has become a redundant relic
of the past.
One strand of the reform was to require board members to undergo six hours of financial
training endorsed by the Office of the State Comptroller. While all of the participants agree that
six hours of financial training is insufficient preparation, none of the participants found any harm
in board members receiving financial training. However, the study participant indicated that the
training received provided far less of the specialized knowledge than a board member would be
required to have in order to engage in financial issues in a meaningful way. Legislators and
professional associations should consider expanding existing training offerings for newer as well
as experienced board members.
The corrective action plan is a mechanism to force districts to address auditor
recommendations, either by adopting them or presenting a strong defense for failing to adopt
them. Even before the reform was implemented, external audits provided school district
administrations with an opportunity to respond to auditor findings. As an audit reached its
conclusion the audit firm’s management submitted findings to the district administration in a

14 Exceptions do exist. Refer to http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/lgmg/claimsauditing.pdf. But many
districts continue the practice of exhaustive claims review.
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document referred to as a “management letter.” The administration’s response to the letter
completed the material that the auditor’s management presented to the board for the public
record. Since a feedback loop existed previously, no recommendation is made concerning the
corrective action plan.
Researcher Reflections
This study was conducted by a researcher conditioned by several personal characteristics
such as gender, age, race, education, professional training and experiences. Importantly,
sensitivities to inherent conflicts and competing demands were developed while working in
public sector financial positions, including as a school business official. All together, the
researcher has a generally conservative outlook on fiscal and professional matters. One might
expect that a person with this type of outlook would believe that the providers of tax revenue, the
state and ultimately the public, have a right to demand financial accountability of its agent, the
school district; and accept auditing as an important and useful tool for that purpose. One might
also expect that a person with this type of outlook would disapprove of wasteful spending. These
values come into conflict when perceived gains of an audit program are not commensurate with
its costs. Because the school business officials who participated in the study are conflicted about
the benefits of the reforms, this project highlights the constant struggle by public managers to
negotiate the goal conflicts and competing demands inherent in the public sector. As Lipsky
(1980) made clear, public managers color policy as they apply their own ethical and technical
judgments to each situation they face.
While the study findings were generally as expected, what is presented in this report is
not simply a narrative of the researcher’s opinions. There were some surprises. Curiously, only
one participant was a teacher before becoming a school business official. The researcher’s
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previous understanding was that school business officials were often recruited from the teaching
ranks. Those who taught mathematics or business were thought to be particularly suitable. It
appears that prior business experience in the private sector has become a valued attribute for a
school business candidate and that the civil service has become the dominant path into the field.
The assimilation of corporate values into school systems could be an important factor that is
shaping the school business function and its practice.
A second surprise was that the participants’ views of the performance audits conducted
by the Office of the State Comptroller have eased over time. The participants related horror
stories of colleagues losing their positions during the first five years of the reform because of
audits conducted by ill-trained and ill-informed state auditors arriving with the express purpose
of “finding something wrong.” In spite of feeling that they continue to be viewed with suspicion
and as incompetent by Office of the State Comptroller staff, the participants indicated that the
quality of the audits and auditors has improved somewhat. This was unexpected, and may reflect
acceptance of a new equilibrium, characterized by auditors wielding greater authority and
compliance with rules being the primary consideration in school business decisions.
A third surprise was the intensity with which the participant’s associated the reform
package with contemporary partisan political agendas playing out in New York State, and how
acutely aware the participants were of the reputational penalties that they could accrue because
of how the reform had been implemented. This lends credence to the assertion of some, like
Power, that auditing regimes are primarily a political expression of power.
Suggestions for Further Research
This project was intended as a study of the effect of a New York State reform featuring
extensive auditing on the organizational commitment of school business officials in public

125

school districts, as they are the officials who are arguably most directly responsible for the
operations subject to audit. The findings and conclusions are based on a sample of ten practicing
school business officials. While the participants provided rich data about their experiences as
school business officials and with the reform of interest, the data provided by additional
participants might have yielded new themes or stronger support for findings that fell just below
the (70%) threshold to be considered a “major” finding. The ten participants in this study were
mostly from a single geographic area in upstate New York. For her 2008 dissertation, Wilner
interviewed five school business officials working in Long Island school districts, also a small
sample. A survey of school business officials from across New York State might result in
findings that are generalizable to the population of school business officials in New York State.
The 2005 financial accountability reform legislation also applied to all general and
special purpose local governments in New York State. Whether financial managers in general
purpose governments share similar attitudes, values and beliefs about their roles and
commitments as do the school business officials who participated in this study is an important
question to be explored. More instrumentally, has the reform affected work environments in
general purpose governments in similar ways as the work environments in public school
districts? Completing a qualitative case study with two cases, one case being fiscal managers in
NYS school districts and the second being NYS local governments would help illuminate
similarities between the two public environments or the experiences of the people who practice
in them.
Financial accountability reforms are being applied to public sector contexts across the
United States. In this vein, further research is needed to determine if and how educational
accountability reforms such as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act or Common Core affect
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the organizational commitment of New York State teachers. On a policy level, comparisons
between U.S. states with unique characteristics would be worthwhile. For example, it would be
useful to know how public sector fiscal managers negotiate financial accountability in states that
do not require compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
This study focused on the perspective of the auditee. The participants were clearly aware
of the reputational penalties that could accrue to them because of how the reform had been
implemented and politicized. It was also a surprise to discover how the participants relied on the
media for signaling potential threats to their positions. Studies exploring reputational penalties in
the public sector would help to connect how superintendents react to various types of issues in
the environment.
Based on these participants, it seems clear that the business official’s relationship with
the district superintendent is important regardless of career stage, evolving from one of
dependence on the superintendent for survival in the business official’s early career, to building a
partnership as the SBO becomes confident and established. Finally toward late career, the
business official may offer his or her expertise to districts under fiscal scrutiny and led by less
experienced superintendents and boards. Studies of how experienced and inexperienced
superintendents perceive audit reports, perhaps using a matched pairs or case study design with
experienced school business officials and inexperienced ones, would more clearly illuminate
circumstances whereby audit findings are likely to impact perceived supervisor support,
reputation and commitment most strongly.
Conclusion
Chapter 5 concludes this research study. The study findings produced three themes that
revealed; a) how the study participants entered and became established in the school business
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career field, b) how participants assess the utility of the reform elements, and c) the participants’
strategies for survival in the post-reform environment. According to the ten participants
interviewed for the study, the accountability demands produced by the reform have affected their
work environment in tangible ways. The participants all share a belief that school districts must
be accountable for their stewardship of public funds, yet their assessments of the utility of the
different reform elements vary. The participants consistently agree that over the ten years since
the reform legislation was passed, the audit regimes have produced little benefit relative to its
cost, yet have been a major factor in creating an environment that is substantially more difficult
for school business officials to survive in.
Of particular interest for this project was elaborating on the mechanisms by which
external controls affect the psychological attachments that bind public sector financial managers
to their organizations. The original theoretical framework created from a review of the literature
proposed that a public financial manager’s organizational commitment was a function of their
perceptual constructions of the job autonomy and supervisor support that they enjoyed, and that
public financial managers’ perceptions of autonomy and support would change as intensified
external controls changed their work environment. The study findings generally support the
original model as proposed, but added to it in an important way by clarifying the role of the
media as a lever to affect the supportive relationship between the superintendent and the school
business official, and as a barometer used by the school business official on which to base
altering their perceptions of supervisor support.
This project extended existing knowledge about how and why school business officials in
New York enter the field and continue to serve while their work environment continues to
change around them in unfavorable ways. Recommendations invite policy-makers to
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contemplate questions of the financial and human costs and benefits required to achieve nearperfect accountability and control. First, because no current system of financial controls can
defeat a determined collusion to circumvent them, policy-makers are invited to consider the costs
of audit regimes and other external controls. Second, policy-makers are invited to consider
whether intense monitoring of school districts constrains initiative at a time when creative
resource management at the district level is urgently needed. Finally, because experienced and
stable financial leadership is important for the fiscal health of school districts (EdSource, 2006;
Westbrook, 2009), policy-makers should reflect on the importance of creating a stable cadre of
skilled school business leaders who are committed to attaining public goals over the long term.
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Appendix A

Timeline and Legislative History
Excerpts from http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov//schoolsfa/app_b.htm on September 6, 2014



Press release: “Hevesi to Audit Roslyn School District” (June 1, 2004)



Press release: “Hevesi Announces Increased Oversight of Schools in Response to Long
Island Financial Scandals” (July 14, 2004)



Assorted articles, editorials and interviews regarding the scandal in the Roslyn Union
Free School District, the development of the Five-Point Plan, and additional audits and
related issues appear in the The New York Times, New York Newsday, The Rockland
County Times, The Watertown Daily Times, The South Shore Press, The CPA Journal,
The Spotlight Newspapers, The Lewisboro Ledger, and The Rockville Centre Herald: July
2004 – November 2005)



Press release: “Four Long Island School Districts to Receive In-Depth Audits,
Administrative Costs to be Audited for at Least 15 More Districts” (August 3, 2004)



Assembly Bill 11829, “An act authorizing the Comptroller to conduct audits of every
school district, BOCES, and charter school, and providing an appropriation therefore,”
introduced by the Committee on Rules at the request of Assemblyman Thomas DiNapoli,
et. al. (August 12, 2004)



Press release: “Hevesi, Education Officials and CPAs Announce Initiatives to Increase
Financial Accountability in Schools” (October 26, 2004)
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Press release: “Audit Finds Extensive Impropriety by Firm That Audited Roslyn School
District & 54 Other School Districts” (January 6, 2005)



Press release: “Hevesi, Saland, DiNapoli and Coalition Call for Increased Oversight for
School Finances” (January 12, 2005)



Senate Bill 890, the “School Accountability Act” that is described as “an act to amend the
education law and the executive law, in relation to audits of school districts, BOCES and
charter schools by the state comptroller,” which was introduced by Senator Carl
Marcellino, Senator Michael Balboni, et. al. (January 21, 2005)



Press Release: “Hevesi Audit Finds School Employees Used at Least $11.2 Million of
Roslyn School Funds for Personal Benefit: Audit of Roslyn Schools Details Breakdown
of Oversight and How Dozens Benefited With Cash, Cars, Travel, Personal Goods at
Taxpayers’ Expense” (March 2, 2005)



Coverage of the Roslyn Union Free School District audit findings (New York Newsday,
March 3, 2005)



Assembly Bill A6082, “Relat(ing) to accountability of school districts” (the Five-Point
Plan) introduced by Assemblyman Thomas DiNapoli (March 4, 2005)



Assembly Bill 6761, “An act authorizing the Comptroller to conduct audits of every
school district, BOCES, and charter school, and providing an appropriation therefore,”
introduced by Assemblyman Thomas DiNapoli, Assemblywoman Patricia Eddington, et.
al. (March 23, 2005)



Senate Bill S5050, “Relat(ing) to accountability of school districts” (the Five-Point Plan)
introduced by Senator Stephen Saland (April 18, 2005)
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Senate Bill S5050A/Assembly Bill 6082B, “An Act to amend the education law, in
relation to accountability of school districts” (passed by the Legislature on June 21, 2005)



Senate Bill S890B/Assembly Bill 6761B, “An Act to amend the education law and the
general municipal law, in relation to audits of school districts, BOCES and charter
schools by the State Comptroller” (passed by the Legislature on June 21, 2005)



Press release: “Legislature Passes School Reform Bills” (June 21, 2005)



Ten-Day Bill Memorandum on Senate Bill S5050A/Assembly Bill 6082B and Senate Bill
S890B/Assembly Bill 6761B in favor of passage (July 14, 2005)



Chapter 263, Laws of 2005, “An Act to amend the education law, in relation to
accountability of school districts” (signed into law on July 19, 2005)



Chapter 267, Laws of 2005, “An Act to amend the education law and the general
municipal law, in relation to audits of school districts, BOCES and charter schools by the
State Comptroller” (signed into law on July 19, 2005)



Press release: “Hevesi Praises Pataki for Signing School Accountability Bills: Calls Bills
a Major Step Forward in Restoring Public Trust in Schools” (July 25, 2005)
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Appendix B
Recruitment Script

*The script is the same for telephone and email.

Hello. My name is Michael Torak. I am a doctoral candidate at Syracuse University’s Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. I used to work as a school business official. Now I am
doing a research project about how school business officials feel about their jobs in light of
recent changes to the State’s system of financial accountability and control. I wonder if I could
visit with you for an hour or so in your office and ask you some questions about that? What you
say will be kept confidential.

Before we can sit down together, I need to send you a form describing your rights as a
participant in the study. Please read it carefully. I’ll contact you in a few days to see if you have
any questions or concerns.

If you decide to participate, we can set up a time to meet. If you have any questions, Feel free to
email me at mtorak@syr.edu or call at 315-443-5840 (desk) or 315-420-8048 (cell). I appreciate
your consideration.
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Appendix C
Consent Form

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL SCHOOL OF CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Maxwell Hall 413
Syracuse, NY 13244

315-443-2275

School Business Officials' Perceptions of a State Program of Financial Controls

My name is Michael Torak, and I am a doctoral candidate at Syracuse University’s Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. I am inviting you to participate in a research study. I
am interviewing several school business officials and I want to talk with you because of your
knowledge of district financial management and operations.
Involvement in the study is voluntary, so you may choose to participate or not. This sheet will
explain the study to you and please feel free to ask questions about the research if you have any.
I will be happy to explain anything in detail if you wish.

134
I am interested in learning more about the role of the school business official in the state’s
system of financial accountability and control. You will be asked to verbally respond to
questions that I will ask. This will take approximately 60 min of your time.
All information will be kept confidential. In any articles I write or any presentations that I make,
I will use a made-up name for you, and I will change details about you such as where you’ve
worked or went to school, etc.
I ask your permission to make an audio recording of the interview. The purpose for recording is
to make note-taking easier. The recordings will only be used for data analysis purposes. A paid
transcriber will create a transcript from the audiotape. When the transcription process is complete
only my faculty advisor, Dr. Stuart Bretschneider, and I will have access to the recordings. The
recordings will be retained for three years and erased when the study is complete.
The benefit of this research is that it will help us understand the effects of financial controls in
the domain of public education, and possibly improve their design.

If you do not want to take part, you have the right to refuse to take part, without penalty. If you
decide to take part, you may decline to answer any question, without penalty. If you decide to
take part and later no longer wish to continue, you have the right to withdraw from the study at
any time, without penalty.

If you have any questions, concerns, complaints about the research, contact Dr. Stuart I.
Bretschneider at 315-443-1890. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant, you have questions, concerns, or complaints that you wish to address to someone
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other than the investigator, or if you cannot reach the investigator contact the Syracuse
University Institutional Review Board at 315-443-3013.

All of my questions have been answered, I am 18 years of age or older, and I wish to participate
in this research study. I have received a copy of this consent form.

___ I agree to be audio recorded.
___ I do not agree to be audio recorded.

_________________________________________
Signature of participant

_________________________
Date

_______________________________________
Printed name of participant

_________________________________________
Signature of researcher

____Michael A. Torak_____________________
Printed name of researcher

_________________________
Date
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Appendix D
Interview Questions

1. To begin, I’d like to know a little about your background. Would you tell me about your
professional training and career path?
[Follow-up] What motivated you to become a school business official?
2. If you weren’t a school business official, what would you prefer to be doing?
[Follow-up] What is it about that occupation/activity that is attractive to you?
3. How much of your job involves working with district finances?
[Follow-up] What kinds of processes does that entail?
[Follow Up] If you created a dashboard for managing district funds, what would the
instruments measure?
4. To what extent do you feel accountable for the district’s financial management and
performance?
5. What are the most important things that you, as a school business official, must do or
accomplish in order to be seen as successful here?
[Follow-up] You are accountable for these things?
[Follow-up] Are there signals that tell you that you’ve done a good job?
6. What about the school business official role do you find particularly satisfying?
7. Still, you’ve described a very demanding job. What about the school business official role
do you find particularly challenging?
[Follow-up] Can any of those challenges be made less challenging? How?
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8. In recent years, New York State has taken several steps to make sure school districts spend
money appropriately. Why do you suppose New York State took those steps?
a. For example, external auditor work must be competitively bid and contract terms
limited. Do you think competitively bidding external auditor work or limiting
contract terms have made any noticeable difference on the financial management
or performance in districts where you’ve worked?
b. Similarly, board members must take several hours of financial training. Do you
think financial training has had any noticeable effect on the financial management
or performance in districts where you’ve worked?
c. There has to be an audit committee and an internal auditor. Do you think an audit
committee and an internal auditor have made any noticeable difference on the
financial management or performance in districts where you’ve worked?
[Follow Up] Have any of these mandates had any impact on the day-to-day demands of the
school business official?
9. Would you describe the various kinds of audits that a school district is subject to?
[Follow Up] What is your general view of audits and auditors?
[Follow Up] Would you describe your involvement with each kind of audit?
[Follow Up] Do you have any stories of a particularly memorable audit?
10. The Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) audited every school district between 2005 and
2010. Some districts were audited several times. What was your experience with the OSC
audits you responded to?
11. Do you think that the OSC audits were well-conducted?
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12. Do you believe that audits conducted by the OSC are beneficial to you, the district, or
anyone else?
13. In your view, what more can (or should) school districts do to satisfy their constituencies
that they are accountable for district finances?
14. Looking back/forward, how do you see the school business official position changing over
time?
15. If a young person approached you and expressed a desire to be a school business official
in New York State, what would your advice be?
[Follow Up] Where do you see your own career going from here?
16. Is there anything else you think I need to know in order to really understand your role in
financial management or how the oversight measures we spoke about have impacted your
role as a school business official?
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Appendix E
Example of Data Auditability for “Creativity” Code
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Presentation in the Final Report

Text on page 77.

144

Bibliography
AICPA (1992). Professional standards: As of June 1, 1992, Volume 2, American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, New York, available at:
http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/ref/collection/aicpa/id/59991.
Aikens, S.K. (2011). An examination of government internal audits’ role in improving financial
performance, Public Finance and Management, 11(4), 306-337.
Aikens, S.K. (2012). Determinants of auditee adoption of audit recommendations: Local
government auditors’ perspectives, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial
Management 24(2), 195-220.
Allen, N.J., & Meyer, J.P. (1990). The measurement and antecedents of affective, continuance
and normative commitment to the organization. Journal of Occupational Psychology,
63(1): 1 – 18.
Allen, N.J., & Meyer, J.P. (1996). Affective, continuance, and normative commitment to the
organization: An examination of construct validity. Journal of Vocational Behavior,
49(3): 252 – 276.
American Educational Research Association (1932). Bibliography on finance and business
management of schools, Review of Educational Research, 2(2), 163-182.
Angle, H.L., & Perry, J.L. (1981). An empirical assessment of organizational commitment and
organizational effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26(1): 1 – 13.
Arrow, K. J. (1985) ‘The economics of agency’, in J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser (eds),
Principals and Agents: the Structure of American Business. Boston: Harvard Business
School Press. pp. 37–51.

145

Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D., & Kinney, W. (2007). The discovery and reporting of internal
control deficiencies prior to SOX-mandated audits. Journal of Accounting and
Economics (44)1-2, 166–192.
Baard, P.P., Deci, E.L., & Ryan, R.M. (2004). Intrinsic need satisfaction: A motivational basis
for performance and well-being in two work settings, Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 34, 2045-2068.
Balfour, D.L., & Wechsler, B. (1990). Organizational commitment: A reconceptualization and
empirical test of public-private differences, Review of Public Personnel Administration
10(3), 23-40.
Balfour, D.L., & Wechsler, B. (1996). Organizational commitment: Antecedents and outcomes
in public organizations, Public Productivity & Management Review 19, 256-277.
Barnard, C. (1938). The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Beaver, W.H. (1989). Financial reporting: An accounting revolution. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Becker, H.S. (1960). Notes on the concept of commitment. American Journal of Sociology, 66,
32-42.
Behn, B.K., Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R., & Hermanson, R.H. (1997). The determinants of
audit client satisfaction among clients of big 6 firms, Accounting Horizons, 11(1), 7-24.
Benson, G.C.S. (1965). Trends in intergovernmental relations. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 359, 1-9.
Boeije, H. (2002). A purposeful approach to the constant comparative method in the analysis of
qualitative interviews, Quality & Quantity, 36, 391-409.
Breaugh, J.A. (1985). The measurement of work autonomy. Human Relations, 38(6), 551-570.

146

Breaugh, J.A. (1999). Further investigation of the work autonomy scales: Two studies, Journal
of Business and Psychology, 13(3), 357-373.
Breaugh, J.A., & Becker, A. S. (1987). Further examination of the work autonomy scales: Three
studies, Human Relations, 40, 381-399.
Brimeyer, T.M., Perrucci, R., & Wadsworth, S.M. (2010). Age, tenure, resources for control and
organizational commitment, Social Science Quarterly 91(2), 511-530.
Boeije, H. (2002). A purposeful approach to the constant comparative method in the analysis of
qualitative interviews, Quality & Quantity, 36, 391-409.
Bozeman, B. (2000). Bureaucracy and red tape. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Brown, R.E. (2005). Enron/Andersen: Crisis in U.S. accounting and lessons for government.
Public Budgeting and Finance, 25(3), 20-32.
Buchanan, B. (1974). Government managers, business executives and organizational
commitment, Public Administration Review, 34(4), 339-347.
Carslaw, C., Mason, R., & Mills, J.R. (2007). Audit timeliness of school district audits, Journal
of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 19(3), 290-316.
Catanach Jr., A.H., & Walker, P.L. (1999). The international debate over mandatory auditor
rotation: A conceptual research framework, Journal of International Accounting,
Auditing & Taxation 8(1), 43-66.
Chang, Y., Leach, N., & Anderman, E.M. (2015). The role of perceived autonomy support in
principals’ affective organizational commitment and job satisfaction, Social Psychology
of Education, DOI 10.1007/s11218-014-9289-z.

147

Charmaz, K. (2003). Grounded theory: Objectivist and constructivist methods. In N. K. Denzin,
and Y.S. Lincoln, (Eds): Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 249-291),
London: Sage Publications.
Charmaz, K. (2006) Constructing Grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative
analysis. London: SAGE.
Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (1999). New Public Management: Design, resistance or
transformation? A study of how modern reforms are received in a civil service system.
Public Productivity & Management Review, 23(2), 169-193.
Coe, C. (2007). Preventing local government fiscal crises: The North Carolina approach, Public
Budgeting & Finance, 7(3), 39-49.
Cohen, A., & Lowenberg, G. (1990). A re-examination of the side-bet theory as applied to
organizational commitment: A meta-analysis. Human Relations, 43, 1015-1050.
Cohen, A. (1992). Antecedents of organizational commitment across occupational groups: A
meta-analysis," Journal of Organizational Behavior 13(6): 539-558
Cohen, A. (1993). Organizational commitment and turnover: A meta-analysis. Academy of
Management Journal, 36(5), 1140-1152.
Copley, P., & Doucet, M. (1993). The impact of competition on the quality of governmental
audits, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 12(1), 88-98.
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (1990). Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative
criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 13, 3-21.
Creswell, J.W. (2005). Educational research: Planning, conducting and evaluating quantitative
and qualitative research, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

148

Creswell, J.W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods
approaches, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Culpepper, R.A. (2011). Three-component commitment and turnover: An examination of
temporal aspects. Journal of Vocational Behavior 79, 517-527.
Dawley, D.D., Andrews, M.C., & Buchlew, N.S. (2008). Mentoring, supervisor support, and
perceived organizational support: What matters most? Leadership & Organization
Development Journal, 29(3). 235-247.
DeAngelo, L. (1981). Auditor size and auditor quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
3(2), 113-127.
Deck, G.E., & Levy, M. (1984). School district performance audits, Public Budgeting & Finance
4(1). 55-63.
Deis, Jr., D.R., & Giroux G.A. (1992). Determinants of audit quality in the public sector, The
Accounting Review, 67(3), 462- 479.
Deis, Jr., D.R., & Giroux G.A. (1996). The effect of auditor changes on audit fees, audit hours,
and audit quality, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 15, 55-76.
Denzin, N.K., & Lincoln, Y. (2003). The landscape of qualitative research: Theories and issues,
2nd ed., London: Sage.
Desai, H. Hogan, C.E., & Wilkins, M.S. (2006). The reputational penalty for aggressive
accounting: Earnings restatements and management turnover, The Accounting Review,
81(1), 83-112.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W.W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48(2), 147–
160.

149

Dittenhofer, M.A. (1971). Performance auditing simplified. Public Administration Review, 31(2),
191-195.
Dittenhofer, M.A. (2001). Performance auditing in governments. Managerial Auditing Journal,
16(8), 438-442.
Division of Educational Management Services (1955). School business management handbook,
Albany: University of the State of New York.
Draucker, C.B., Martsoff, D.S., Ross, M., & Rusk, T.B. (2007). Theoretical sampling and
category development in grounded theory, Qualitative Health Research, 17(8), 11371148.
Dunn, D.D., & Legge Jr., D.D. (2000). U.S. local government managers and the complexity of
responsibility and accountability in democratic governance. Journal of Public
Administration Research & Theory, 11(1), 73-88.
EdSource (2006). School district financial management: Personnel, policies and practices.
Retrieved from http://www.edsource.org/assets/files/DistrictMgmtSummary.pdf.
Eisenberger, R., Fasolo, P., & Davis-LaMastro, V. (1990). Perceived organizational support and
employee diligence, commitment and innovation, Journal of Applied Psychology, 75(1),
51-59.
Eisenberger, R., Stinglhamber, F., Vandenberghe, C., Sucharski, I. L., & Rhoades, L. (2002).
Perceived supervisor support: Contributions to perceived organizational support and
employee retention, Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(3), 565-573.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management
Review, 14, 57–74.

150

Elder, R. J., & Yebba, A.A. (2014). The effect of state regulation on school district auditor
choice and internal control reporting, (Working Paper).
Fernandez, R., & Rodrik, D. (1991). Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the presence of
individual–specific uncertainty. The American Economic Review, (81)5, 1146-1155.
Firth, M., Rui, O.M., & Wu, X. (2012). Do various forms of auditor rotation affect audit quality:
Evidence from China, International Journal of Accounting, 47(1), 109 –138.
Fitzgerald, B.C., & Giroux, G.A. (2014). Voluntary formation of audit committees by large
municipal governments, Research in Accounting Regulation, 26, 67-74.
Francis, J.R., (2004). What do we know about audit quality? The British Accounting Review, 36,
345-368.
Frank, H.A. (2008). Enhancing accountability: Should regulations similar to Sarbanes-Oxley be
applied to the public sector? Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial
Management, 20(4), 510-536.
Friedberg, A., & Lutrin, C. (2001). The internal audit in U.S. local government in the 1990s: A
status report and challenges, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial
Management, 13(3), 325-344.
Giroux, G., Deis, D., & Bryan, B. (1995). The effect of peer review on audit economies,
Research in Accounting Regulation, 9, 63-82.
Glaser, B. G. (1992). Basics of grounded theory analysis. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine.
Graham, L. (2008). Internal controls: Guidance for private, government and non-profit entities.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

151

Greenbank, P. (2003). The role of values in educational research: The case for reflexivity, British
Educational Research Journal, 29(6).
Greenhalgh, J. (1978). Practitioner's guide to school business management, Boston: Allyn and
Bacon.

Guba, E.G., & Lincoln, Y.S. (1989). Fourth generation evaluation, Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications.
Gutmann, A. (1987) Democratic Education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Harmon, M. (1995). Responsibility as paradox: A critique of rational discourse on government.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Harris, J. (2005). The discourse of governmental accounting and auditing, Public Budgeting &
Finance 25(4). 154-179.
Healy, T.J. & Kim, Y-J. (2003). The benefits of mandatory auditor rotation, Regulation, 26(3),
10-11.
Hood, C. (2007). What happens when transparency meets blame avoidance? Public Management
Review, 9(2), 191-210.
Hood, C., & Peters, G. (2004). The middle aging of New Public Management: Into the age of
paradox? Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 14(3), 267-282.
Huefner, R.J. (2010). Local government fraud: The Roslyn school district case. Management
Research Review, 33(3), pp. 198-209.
Jenkins, D.S., & Vermeer, T.E. (2013). Audit firm rotation and audit quality: Evidence from
academic research, Accounting Research Journal, 26(1), 75-84.
Jordan, K. F. (1969). School business administration, New York: Ronald Press Co.

152

Jos, P.E., & Tompkins, M.E. (2004). The accountability paradox in an age of reinvention: The
perennial problem of preserving character and judgment. Administration & Society 36(3),
255-281.
Kalbers, L.P., & Cenker, W. J. (2008). The impact of exercised responsibility, experience,
autonomy, and role ambiguity on job performance in public accounting, Journal of
Managerial Issues, 20(3), 327-347.
Khalil, F., & Lawarée, J. (2006). Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of
commitment, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 54(2), 269-291.
Kim, J-B., & Yi, C. H. (2009). Does auditor designation by the regulatory authority improve
auditor quality? Evidence from Korea, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 28, 207230.
Knezevich, S.J., & Fowlkes, J.G., (1960). Business management of local school systems, New
York: Harper.
Kottke, J.L., & Sharafinski, C.E. (1988). Measuring perceived supervisory and organizational
support, Educational and Psychological Measurement, 48, 1075-1079.
Lankford, H., Loeb, S., & Wyckoff, J. (2002). Teacher sorting and the plight of urban schools,
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis (24), 1, pp. 37-62.
Lipsky, Michael (2010). Street level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services.
30th Anniversary Expanded Edition. New York, NY: The Russell Sage Foundation.
Lowensohn, S., Johnson, L.E., Elder, R.J., & Davies, S.P. (2005). Auditor specialization and
perceived audit quality, auditee satisfaction and audit fees in the local government audit
market, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26(6), 705-732.
March J., & Simon, H. (1958). Organizations, New York, NY: The Free Press.

153

Maertz, C.P., Griffith, R.W., Campbell, N.S., & Allen, D.G. (2007). The effects of perceived
organizational support and perceived supervisor support on employee turnover. Journal
of Organizational Behavior 28, 1059-1075.
Mathieu, J. E., & Zajac, D. M. (1990). A review and meta-analysis of the antecedents, correlates,
and consequences of organizational commitment. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 171-194.
Matkin, D. (2010). In the shadows of corporate scandal: The use of audit committees in U.S.
local governments, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management,
22(2), 206-226.
Mayer, R.C., & Schoorman, F.D. (1998). Differentiating antecedents of organizational
commitment: A test of March and Simon’s model, Journal of Organizational Behavior,
(19), 15-28.
McGee, G.W., & Ford, R.C. (1987). Two (or more?) dimensions of organizational commitment:
Re-examination of the affective and continuance commitment scales. Journal of Applied
Psychology 72, 638-642.
Meyer, J., & Allen, N. (1991). A three-component conceptualization of organizational
commitment, Human Resource Management Review, 1, 61-89.
Meyer, J., Stanley, D., Herscovitch, L., & Topolnytsky, L. (2002). Affective, continuance and
normative commitment to the agency: A meta-analysis of antecedents, correlates, and
consequences. Journal of Vocational Behavior 61(1), 20-52.
Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis, (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.
Mills, J., Bonner, A., & Francis, K. (2006). The development of constructivist grounded theory.
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(1), 1-10.

154

Modlin, S. (2012). County government finance practices: What independent auditors are finding
and what makes local government susceptible, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting
& Financial Management, 24(4), 558-578.
Modlin, S., & Stewart, L. (2014). Local government staff involvement in the external audit
process: Reassessing independent auditee satisfaction levels among professionally
administered county governments, 38(2), 246-272.
Moe, T.M. (1989). The politics of bureaucratic structure. In Can the government govern? ed. J.
E. Chubb and P. E. Peterson, 267–329. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Moon, M.J. (2000). Organizational commitment revisited in New Public Management:
Motivation, organizational culture, and managerial level, Public Performance &
Management Review 24(2), 177-194.
Mowday, R., Steers, R., & Porter, L. (1979). The measurement of organizational commitment.

Journal of Vocational Behavior, 14, 224-247
Moynihan, D.P., & Pandey, S.K. (2007). The role of organizations in fostering public service
motivation, Public Administration Review, 67(1), 40-53.
Novick, G. (2008). Is there a bias against telephone interviews in qualitative research? Research
in Nursing & Health, 31, 391-398.
O’Connor, M. K., Netting, F. E., & Thomas, M. L. (2008). Grounded theory: Managing the
challenge for those facing institutional review board oversight. Qualitative Inquiry, 14(1),
28-45.
Office of the New York State Comptroller. (2004). Five-point plan [Press release]. Retrieved
from http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/oct04/5pointplan.htm.

155

Office of the New York State Comptroller. (2013). Improving the effectiveness of your claims
auditing process. Retrieved from
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/lgmg/claimsauditing.pdf.
O’Keefe, T.B., King, R.D., & Gaver, K.M. (1994). Audit fees, industry specialization and
compliance with GAAS reporting standards, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,
13(2), 41-55.
O’Reilly, C., III, & Chatman, J. (1986). Organizational commitment and psychological
attachment: The effects of compliance, identification, and internalization on prosocial
behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71: 492-499.
O’Toole, L. (1984). American public administration and the idea of reform. Administration &
Society, 16, 141-166.
O’Toole, L.J., & Meyer, K.J. (1999). Modeling the impact of public management: Implications
of structural context. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9, 505–526.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes, The Academy of Management
Review, 16(1), 145-179.
Pautz, M.C., & Washington, C.P. (2009). Sarbanes-Oxley and the relentless pursuit of
government accountability: The perils of 21st century reform. Administration & Society,
41 (6), 651-673.
Pearson, C.L. (1998). The prediction of teacher autonomy. Educational Research Quarterly,
22(1), 33-46.
Perry, J. (1996). Measuring public service motivation: An assessment of construct validity.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6, 5-22.

156

Perry, J. L., & Wise, L. R. (1990). The motivational bases of public service. Public
Administration Review, 50(3), 367-373.
Pollitt, C., & Summa, H. (1999). Performance audit and public management reform, in Pollitt,
C., Girre, X., Lonsdale, J., Mul, R., Summa, H., & Waerness, M. (eds.), Performance or
compliance? Performance audit and public management in five countries, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999.
Powell, D.M., & Meyer, J.P. (2004). Side-bet theory and the three component model of
organizational commitment, Journal of Vocational Behavior, 66(1), 157-177.
Power, M. (2003), Auditing and the production of legitimacy, Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 28 (4), 379-394.
Previts, G.J., & Brown, R.E. (1993). The development of governmental accounting: A content
analysis of the Journal of Accountancy, 1905 to 1989, The Accounting Historians
Journal, 20(2), 119-138.
Reed, B.J., & Swain, J.W. (1997). Public finance administration, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Reeder, W.G. (1932). Fiscal control and textbooks in business management of schools, Review of
Educational Research, 2(2), 134-138.
Rhoades, L., & Eisenberger, R. (2002). Perceived organizational support: A review of the
literature. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4), 698-714.
Ritzer, G., & Trice, H. (1969). An empirical study of Howard Becker’s side-bet theory. Social
Forces, 47, 475-479.
Roberts, J. (2009). No one is perfect: The limits of transparency and an ethic for ‘intelligent’
accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34, 957-970.

157

Roberts, N.C. (2002). Keeping public officials accountable through dialogue: Resolving the
accountability paradox,” Public Administration Review, 62(6), 658-669.
Roe, W.H. (1961). School Business Management. New York: McGraw-Hill.230
Rokeach, M. (1968). Beliefs, attitudes, and values: A theory of organization and change, San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968.
Rusbult, C.E., & Farrell, D. (1993). A longitudinal test of the investment model: The impact on
job satisfaction, job commitment, and turnover of variations in rewards, costs,
alternatives, and investments. Journal of Applied Psychology, 68:3, 429-438.
Ryan, G.W., & Bernard, H.R. (2003). Techniques to identify themes in qualitative data, Field
Methods, 15(1), 85-109.
Saito, Y., & McIntosh, C.S. (2010). The economic value of auditing and its effectiveness in
public school operations, Contemporary Accounting Research 27(2), 639-667.
Saldaña, J. (2009). The coding manual for qualitative researchers. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
Publications, Inc.
Samelson, D., Lowensohn, S., & Johnson, L.E. (2006). The determinants of perceived audit
quality and auditee satisfaction in local government, Journal of Public Budgeting,
Accounting & Financial Management, 18(2), 139-166.
Schaefer, H.P. (1957). Comments on the audits of school districts, The Accounting Review,
32(3), 428-430.
Schelker, M., & Eichenberger, R. (2010). Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a
little big institution, Journal of Comparative Economics 38(4): 357-380.
Schön, D.A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. New York,
NY: Basic Books, Inc.

158

Seder, R. C. (2000). Balancing accountability and local control: State intervention for financial
and academic stability (Policy Study No. 268). Los Angeles: Reason Public Policy
Institute. Retrieved January 28, 2014, from
http://reason.org/files/7832d5e4bb0fabb916042f7646871d36.pdf.
Segal, L. (2002). Roadblocks in reforming corrupt agencies: The case of the New York City
school custodians, Public Administration Review 62, 445-460.
Segal, L. (2004). Battling corruption in America's public schools. Boston: Northeast University
Press.
Seidman, I. (2006). Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education and
the social sciences (3rd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press.
Shapiro, B., & Matson, D. (2007). Strategies of resistance to internal control regulation.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33, 199-228.
Shockley, R.A. (1982). Perceptions of auditors’ independence. The Accounting Review, 56(4),
785-800.
Shore, L.M., Tetrick, L.E., Shore, T.H., & Barksdale, K. (2000). Construct validity of measures
of Becker’s Side Bet Theory, Journal of Vocational Behavior, 57(3), 428-444.
Simmons, T.N., Costigan, M.L., & Lovata, L.M. (2009). Mandatory audit firm rotation:
Evidence from Illinois state universities. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies
Journal, 13(3), 123-132.
Skaalvik, E.M., & Skaalvik, S. (2009). Teacher self-efficacy and teacher burnout: A study of
relations. Teaching and Teacher Education 26, 1059-1069.

159
Somech, A., & Oplatka, I. (2009). Coping with school violence through the lens of teacher’s role
breadth: The impact of participative management and job autonomy, Educational
Administration Quarterly, 45(3), 423–449.
Stazyk, E.C., Pandey, S.K., & Wright, B.E. (2011). Understanding affective organizational
commitment: The importance of institutional context, The American Review of Public
Administration, 41(6), 603-624.
Steinhaus, C.S., & Perry, J.L. (1996). Organizational commitment: Does sector matter?, Public
Productivity & Management Review, 19(3), 278-288.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1994). Grounded Theory methodology: An overview, In N. K. Denzin,
and Y.S. Lincoln, (Eds): Handbook of Qualitative Research. Sage Publications, London,
1-18.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures
and techniques, (2nd ed.) London: SAGE.
Taing, M. U., Granger, B. P., Groff, K. W., Jackson, E. M., & Johnson, R. E. (2011). The
multidimensional nature of continuance commitment: Commitment owing to economic
exchanges versus lack of employment alternatives. Journal of Business and Psychology,
26(3), 269–284
Ter Bogt, H.J. (2008). Management accounting change and new public management in local
government: A reassessment of ambitions and results — an institutionalist approach to
accounting change in the Dutch public sector, Financial Accountability & Management,
24(3), 209-241.
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. (1993). State laws
governing local government structure and administration, M-186, Washington, DC.

160

Van Dam, K. (2005). Employee attitudes toward job changes: An application and extension of
Rusbult and Farrell’s investment model, Journal of Occupational and Organizational
Psychology, 78, 253-272.
Vandrew, A.T. (2012). Chief school business officials: A qualitative investigation of employment
longevity and the career plateau, Downloaded from

http://dspace.iup.edu/bitstream/handle/2069/774/Alan%20T.%20Vandrew.pdf?sequence=
1 on May 4, 2015.
Vandenberghe, C., & Panaccio, A. (2015). Delving into the motivational bases of continuance
commitment: Locus of control and empowerment as predictors of perceived sacrifice and
few alternatives, European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 24(1), 1-14,
DOI: 10.1080/1359432X.2013.844126
Verbruggen, S., Chaistiaens, J., & Milis, K. (2011). Can resource dependence and coercive
isomorphism explain nonprofit organization’s compliance with reporting standards?,
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(1), 5-32.
Wallace, J.E. (1997). Becker’s side bet theory of commitment revisited: Is it time for a
moratorium or resurrection? Human Relations, 50, 727-749.
Wallace, W.A. (1988). The demand for audit services by municipalities, Ohio CPA Journal, 47,
29-34.
Wallace, W.A. (2004). The economic role of the audit in free and regulated markets: A look back
and a look forward, Research in Accounting Regulation, 17, pp. 267-298.
Weiner, Y. (1982). Commitment in organizations: A normative view. Academy of Management
Review, 7, 418-428.

161

Wengraf, T. (2001). Qualitative research interviewing: Biographic narrative and semistructured methods, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
West, J., & Berman, E. (2003). Audit committees and accountability in local government: A
national survey, International Journal of Public Administration, 26(4), 329-362.
Westbrook, P. (2009). The relationship between the educational qualifications of chief financial
officers and the effectiveness of local district financial leadership in Alabama public
schools: A policy analysis. Academic Leadership 7(3).
Wheat, E.M. (1991). The activist auditor: A new player in state and local politics. Public
Administration Review 51(5): 385–392.
Williams, L.J., & Anderson, S.E. (1991), “Job satisfaction and organizational commitment as
predictors of organizational citizenship and in-role behaviours”, Journal of Management,
17(3), 601-617.
Wilner, J. L. (2008). Long island school business officials' perceptions of the New York State
School Fiscal Accountability Legislation of 2005 and their suggestions for improvements
(Order No. 3386094). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Full Text.
(304835247). Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304835247?accountid=14214.
Wolf, W.B. (1994). Understanding Chester I. Bernard, International Journal of Public
Administration, 17(6), 1035-1069.
Wright, B.E., Christensen, R.K., & Pandey, S.K. (2013). Measuring public service motivation:
Exploring the equivalence of existing global measures, International Journal Public
Management Journal, 16(2), 197-223, DOI: 10.1080/10967494.2013.817242.

162

Yang, K., & Pandey, S.K. (2009). How do perceived political environment and administrative
reform affect employee commitment? Journal of Public Administration Research &
Theory, 19(2), 335-360.
Yoon, J., & Thye, S. (2000). Supervisor support in the workplace: Legitimacy and positive
affectivity. Journal of Social Psychology, 140, 295-316.
Zimmerman, J.L. (1977). The municipal accounting maze: An analysis of political incentives,
Journal of Accounting Research, 15, 107-144.

163

Vita
NAME OF AUTHOR:

Michael A. Torak

PLACE OF BIRTH:

Syracuse, New York, USA

DATE OF BIRTH:

October, 6, 1955

DEGREES AWARDED:
Master of Science in Telecommunications, 2001
State University of New York Institute of Technology, Utica, New York
Master of Public Administration, 1984
Bachelor of Arts in Sociology, 1982
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
Associate of Science in Administration of Justice, 1976
Onondaga Community College, Syracuse, New York
LICENSING:
School Business Administrator – Permanent
New York State Education Department
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Syracuse University
Syracuse City School District
Boise State University
Onondaga-Cortland-Madison Board of Cooperative Educational Services
State University College at Oswego
Onondaga County (NY)

